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ABSTRACT 
The economic factors in the Arab–Israeli Conflict are often overshadowed by its more 
powerful political features, but economics plays a significant, if not equal, role in the 
conflict’s protracted nature. Like politics, however, economics cannot singlehandedly 
harbor a solution. From Israel’s perspective alone, a solution based on economic peace 
faces serious obstacles: Israeli nationalism, the State-reliant structure of Israel’s 
economy, and the imbalance of power between Israel and Palestine mean the 
preconditions for economic peace are currently unattainable. This thesis outlines the 
obstacles to economic peace but does not hasten to reject an economic approach to an 
ultimate agreement. Rather, this examination of why, under existing conditions, 
economic peace will fail exposes the political economy of the conflict in Israel. Until the 
obstacles to economic peace, as defined by scholars rather than politicians are addressed 
and surmounted, peace, whether it be called a primarily economic or political peace, will 
remain elusive. Economic peace, therefore, warrants serious consideration as a gauge of 
both the economic and political conditions necessary for any lasting compromise and as a 
means to mediate the polarizing effects of identity politics, ideology, and isolation. 
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I. “THE DOG THAT DIDN’T’ BARK”  
In a short essay on economic security, Dov S. Zakheim, former undersecretary of 
defense in the Reagan administration and foreign-policy advisor for George W. Bush, 
wrote:  
Given its continuing dependence on the Unites States for both its military 
and economic well-being, and the degree to which its educational and 
intellectual institutions are closely attuned to American trends, one would 
expect Israel to be particularly sensitive to any new formulations that 
sweep the Washington policy-making establishment. It should therefore 
come as no surprise that some leading Israeli policy-makers, most notably 
Prime Minister Shimon Peres, have increasingly argued that the evolving 
Middle East will become one in which economic rather than military 
concerns will predominate; that the key to lasting peace in the Middle East 
is private free enterprise rather than inter-governmental aid; and that the 
importance of conventional military capability can be expected to decline 
in the twenty-first century. To some extent as well, this view is implicit in 
the nature of the Israeli government’s concessions for a settlement with 
Syria: in exchange for territorial withdrawal it seeks “normalization.” In 
other words, it is prepared to pay a conventional military price that, in the 
past, would have been considered particularly high in light of the strategic 
terrain involved. In exchange it seeks the prospect of potential economic 
cooperation that, when, seen as a spur to increasing economic integration 
with the rest of the Muslim world, will yield the engine for peace that 
Peres dreams of.1  
Swap the land of Syria for the greater Middle East, Peres’s name for Netanyahu’s, 
and this 1996 statement nearly described the summer of 2013, as U.S. Secretary of State 
John Kerry forged ahead with a campaign to initiate economic peace. Kerry’s plan makes 
the United States second on the new economic-peace bandwagon, which began in 2002, 
when the Arab League ratified an outline for a plan that calls for Israeli territorial 
concessions in exchange for normalization (i.e., Israel’s full access to the Middle 
East/North African economy). In response, a conglomeration of Israeli businessmen, ex-
security officials, and academics wrote the Israeli Peace Initiative, which calls for a 
return to talks guided by economic incentive. Secretary Kerry’s addition is to entice 
                                                 
1 Efraim Karsh, Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security (Portland: Frank Cass, 1996), 
13. 
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Palestine to the table by offering millions in foreign investment. All four major players—
Israel, Palestine, the Arab League, and the United States—have at least a toe in the waters 
of commercial peace. And why not? Economic peace seems like a rational alternative to 
the zero-sum direction of current affairs and, in this age of global trade, more inevitable 
than in 1995.  
But not all see a rosy picture. Critics of economic peace argue from two positions: 
either that economic peace undermines security efforts or that a political solution must 
precede an economic one. Both these objections, while superficially convincing, fail to 
account for the role economics plays in both security and politics.  
There is extensive literature on the Arab–Israeli conflict; yet despite minute 
analysis in terms of politics, there is little scholarship on the role of economics, whether 
in relation to security, protraction of the conflict, or influence on political agreements and 
outcomes. Economics truly is “the dog that didn’t bark” in the Arab–Israeli conflict, 
perhaps because it is so integral to the dynamics of this strife that if often escapes 
scrutiny. 
The conventional security concern, which justifies Israel’s “de-development” 
strategy, is that relaxation of the Israeli–Palestinian border enables terrorism, and if 
Palestinians were able to acquire capital, it could be used for weapons and lobbying 
against Israel. This argument is outlined by B’tselem in Arrested Development: the Long-
Term Impact of Israel’s Separation Barrier in the West Bank. As Alan Dershowitz points 
out, Israel’s retreat from Gaza has only led to more vitriol against Israel. 
This conclusion, however, is problematic. The World Bank, Human Rights 
Watch, UN reports, and other humanitarian agencies ask, “how will cooperation (and 
peace) ever develop if Israel continues to undermine the growth of Palestine’s economy 
and its moderate middle class, through its debilitating security measures?” While Gaza 
has fewer Israeli troops on the ground, it is more restricted and “de-developed” than the 
West Bank, which suggests that stifling economic policies only encourage terrorism. 
While most of the literature focuses on the devastating consequences of this 
strategy, few authors give a satisfactory reason for it, economic or otherwise. Neither 
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have they directly asked, with the exception of Shir Hever, why Israel has not seriously 
pursued an avenue of commercial peace and cooperation in the formulation of a peace 
agreement. Most notably, Sara Roy in The Gaza Strip and Marwan Bishara in 
Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid sidestep this debate by asserting that economics is 
subordinate to politics, without sufficiently explaining why. Roy identifies the ideological 
importance of land, but many scholars have mistakenly framed the conflict in terms of 
class struggle. As authors like Danny Gutwein note, the Israeli underclass tends to have 
the most hostility toward a peace agreement. As Shir Hever points out, capitalists are not 
benefitting from the occupation or settlements.2 
The politics-first argument has a similar illogical strain. In political agreements 
from the Balfour Declaration to Oslo, the lack of specificity about economics (including 
trade liberties, capital inequalities, and the vital issue of property rights)has rendered 
peace and policy agreements ineffective. While politicians preach the need to address 
economic issues, they rarely do so. Apart from a few, including Shir Hever, Neve 
Gordon, in Israel’s Occupation, and Sara Roy, few have examined political actions from 
an economic angle. 
Ideology drives the conflict, but its means are economic. Yet it is also true that 
economics shapes ideology. The general paucity of discussion on the role of economics 
in the relationship between the Israeli and Arab peoples suggests a pervasive 
misapprehension of the importance of economics in the path to peace. It is with great 
circumspection that I attempt to add to the debate by pointing out why economics is 
subordinate to politics and that these realities are the very obstacles to political resolution.  
A. ECONOMIC PEACE THEORY 
Economic-peace theory asserts that a cooperative political relationship can be 
founded on mutually beneficial commercial interests. This idea has seen widespread 
resurgence in economic and international-relations literature and on the political scene. 
The idea is not new: Montesquieu, Bastiat, Mill, Cobden, Angell, and Adam Smith 
                                                 
2 Shir Hever, The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation: Repression beyond Exploitation (New 
York: Pluto Press, 2010), 151. 
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discussed its potential.3 It has also had critics: Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued 
for the alternative of economic self-reliance.4 The most devastating refutation has been 
the resounding failure of its proponents to predict peace. Norman Angell’s The Great 
Illusion hypothesized that globally invested capitalists would prevent World War I; he 
did not foresee that economic interests would counterbalance political–nationalist 
pressures. Nevertheless, such was the belief in his ideas that he was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1933, in spite of his theory’s resounding inadequacy. 
Angell failed to account for the economic forces of protectionism, nationalism, 
and perceived social and economic inequalities, which completely swept aside immediate 
trade interests. But, while Angell’s methodology was flawed, his thesis should not be 
brushed aside. Economic peace, by another definition, predicts conflict where its 
indicators are absent. Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher in “The Imperialism of Free 
Trade,” John Hobson in The New Imperialism, and, most notably, John Maynard Keynes, 
argued that indicators for economic peace were absent before the outbreak of the world 
wars. Instead, conflict was encouraged by economic factors, particularly protectionist 
trade relations and insular political economies with international ambitions. Economic 
interdependence per se, does not equal economic peace. Rather, it is the nature of that 
interdependence that brings peace or war. 
This distinction is crucial for scholars of economic peace in the post-2000 era. 
Interest in economic peace has reignited due to the Soviet Union’s collapse, the 
emergence of vast global economic systems, and the collection of new statistical data 
supporting the economic-interdependence/peace link, the result of large n-study 
measurements since 1980. 
Groundwork for the expansion of economic-peace theory was laid by Brian 
Pollins in his articles, “Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce,” and “Does Trade Still 
Follow the Flag.” Walter Isard was one of the principal architects of an empirical 
                                                 
3 IKV Pax Christi. “Analyzing Israel’s Economic Policy Towards Palestine and the Practical 
Implications of Netanyahu’s Economic Peace” (Commissioned, Amsterdam: IKV pax Christi, 2012), 9. 
4 Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M Pollins. “The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent 
Advances, Open Questions, ad Directions for Future Research.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 
6 (December 2001): 834–859, 837. 
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methodology for economic-peace theory, relying on rational-choice theory and game 
theory derived from the field of economics.5 In 1994, Isard defined economic peace as 
“(1) resolution, management, or reduction of conflict in the economic sphere; (2) the use 
of economic measures and policy to cope with and control conflicts whether economic or 
not; (3) the impact of conflict on economic behavior and welfare of firms, consumers 
organizations, government, and society.”6 Raul Caruso refined Isard’s definition by 
drawing a third distinction, between productive and unproductive activities as defined by 
classical economics. He argues that conflict and market structures are not independent. 
Rather, conflict is integrated into a market in varying degrees. Caruso’s research is part of 
the recent effort to refine the definition of those measurable factors required for economic 
peace. 
Despite the scientific approach to economic peace developed in the 1990s, a great 
deal of contention remains in the field of international relations. Liberals see the 
correlation between market integration and peace as causal; realists, who are skeptical 
that trade affects high-politics issues, contend that trade gains benefit a small minority.7 
Skeptics on both positions, like Barry Buzan in “Economic Structure and International 
Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case,” find very little relationship between economic 
interdependence and peace. 
Realist literature was most prolific before the Soviet Union’s collapse, with 
writers like Albert Hirschman in National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 
Eugene Staley, in The World Economy in Transition, and Kenneth Waltz in The Myth of 
National Interdependence. Their position was countered by liberals Michael Doyle in 
Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism and Joanne Gowa and 
Edward Mansfield in “Power Politics and International Trade.”  
                                                 
 
6 Walter Isard, “Peace Economics: A Topical Perspective.” Peace Economic, Peace Science, and 
Public Policy 1, no. 2 (1994): 1, 6–9. 
7 Galia Press-Barnathan, “The Neglected Dimension of Commercial Liberalism: Economic 
Cooperation and Transition to Peace.” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 3 (May 2006): 261–278, 262. 
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Typical of current theorists, Galia Press-Barnathan attempts to incorporate realist 
and liberal theory by focusing on the discrepancy between the strong correlation between 
economic interdependence and peaceful relations in many cases and the failure to predict 
it in others. She points out that research focuses on why interdependence among nations 
prevents conflict, not on whether it can create peace—a subtle but important distinction. 8  
A succinct statement of liberal theory on economic-peace theory, which also 
highlights the importance of nuance, is Patrick J MacDonald’s “Peace through Trade or 
Free Trade?” McDonald writes,  
The debate over whether and how international commerce alters the 
foreign policy of states, and in particular the decision of war, has gained 
renewed prominence in the fields of international security and 
international political economy. Despite substantial empirical support for 
the proposition that increasing levels of cross-border economic flows–
defined either in terms of trade or capital movements–decrease the 
probability of conflict, scholars have yet to approach a consensus 
concerning the precise nature of this link.9  
McDonald explains that understanding trade interaction is crucial in defining 
economic peace theory; economic peace is founded on a free-trade relationship while 
protectionism leads to conflict.10 For the purposes of this thesis, economic peace is 
defined as economic policy and market forces that support and extend peaceful, 
cooperative international relations, empirically measured by the extent of free trade, limit 
of protectionism, scope of the military-industrial complex in the economy, reach of the 
state in economic affairs, degree of equality in the political and economic leverage 
between given states, extent of individual access to capital and markets, extent of 
contested resources, and the perception of respect in economic exchange. 
Press-Barnathan’s “The Neglected Dimension of Commercial Liberalism: 
Economic Cooperation and Transition to Peace” and IKV Pax Christi’s report, 
“Analyzing Israel’s Economic Policy Towards Palestine and the Practical Implications of 
                                                 
8 Press-Barnathan, “The Neglected Dimension of Commercial Liberalism,” 262. 
9 Patrick McDonald, “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 
4 (August 2002): 547–572, 547. 
10 McDonald, “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?,” 556. 
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Netanyahu’s Economic Peace” are among works that have examined the potential of 
economic peace to catalyze a new peace process in the Arab–Israeli conflict. But there 
has been no comprehensive examination of how economic peace might serve as the 
measure of a successful political process. Economic peace is considered under existing 
conditions rather than in relation to a web of connected variables. The IVK Pax Christi 
Report, for example, concludes that a political solution must be found before an 
economic, which brings all concerned no closer to resolution than under Israel’s 
conclusion that a security solution must come first. The problem is that political and 
security solutions are not independent from economic solutions—all three must be 
addressed simultaneously. The resolution of this conundrum is far from simple. Who the 
players are matters as much as how economic peace will be implemented. However, if 
economics continues to be neglected in a political solution, and politics neglected in an 
economic solution, a broken compromise will prevail. 
B. IDEOLOGY’S INCENTIVE: WHY POLITICS SUBORDINATES 
ECONOMICS 
The study of Israel’s attitude toward economic cooperation with Palestine must 
begin long before Israel’s naissance and before security was an issue. Before the state of 
Israel was declared in 1948, Arabs and Jews shared a territory and an economy. Jacob 
Metzer, in The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, argues that while there was 
certainly interaction between the two peoples, there was more differentiation than 
intersection in terms of education, wages, and trade. In Little Common Ground: Arab 
Agriculture and Jewish Settlement in Palestine 1920–1948, Charles Kamen takes the 
view that any “dual economy” notion is false. This view is echoed in Zachary Lockman’s 
Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906–1948. Jews and 
Arabs experienced great disparity, but their economic success and failure cannot be 
explained independently. Metzer, Kamen, and Lockman agree, however, that although 
the degree of economic cooperation between Jews and Arabs is debatable, Jewish and 
Arab nationalism inhibited full economic integration from the beginning. 
Kamen and Lockman examine the Zionist’s view of the native Arabs. While the 
Zionists were socialist and some sought to include Arabs in their new workers’ society, 
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they tended to believe the Arabs were inferior by race and culture, an attitude typical of 
European socialists of the day. Far from seeing religious differences as contentious, the 
Zionists simply saw the Arabs as incidental to the region and their designs for it. Both 
authors cite Zionist claims before the Mandate government that Palestinians would 
benefit economically from Jewish migration, but do not delve into the reasons Zionists 
never significantly delivered on this, aside from oppression in Europe and Russia against 
Jews, scarcity of resources, urgency concerning their need for an independent state, and a 
low regard for the existing population. 
Had the socialist ideology of early Zionism remained after the colonizing effort in 
Palestine was complete, the idea of economic peace might once again have been 
rekindled. The conflict was initially shaped by territorial, and consequently economic, 
loss. The peasant majority of Palestine was not so much deprived of property as of 
livelihood; most were tenants of the land they worked. After the creation of Israel, there 
might have been an opportunity to slowly build up economic ties with at least the most 
proximal Palestinians, but the 1967 War widened social rifts. It was not so much the 
occupation itself, but the religious zeal it ignited that fomented a new basis for conflict, 
apart from secular nationalism.  
In The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian 
Intifada, Reuven Kaminer describes how Israel’s apparently miraculous victory in the 
1967 war transformed Zionist ideology from secular to religious. Settlement, thereafter, 
was not merely a political and economic imperative, but, increasingly, a spiritual one. 
Pervasive nationalism and, later, religious fundamentalism, explain why free-market 
interests were marginalized in the formation of the state, and consequently in the 
structure of the Israeli economy. 
The effects of settlement and the perception of threat in acknowledging a 
sovereign Palestine are outlined in Israeli Obstacles to Economic Development in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, published by the Jerusalem Media & Communication 
Centre. This source focuses on the implementation of Israel’s apparent strategy of 
strangling the Palestinian economy, but does not address the rationale for this policy, 
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other than quoting a 1961 admonishment by founder of the Likud and Sixth Prime 
Minister of Israel, Menachem Bengin,  
My Friend, take care. When you recognize the concept of “Palestine,” you 
demolish your right to life in Ein Hahoresh. If this is Palestine and not the 
land of Israel, then you are conquerors and not tillers of the land. You are 
invaders. If this is Palestine, then it belongs to a people who lived here 
before you came…You came to another people’s homeland, as they claim, 
you expelled them and you have taken their land.11  
Israeli Obstacles specifically outlines the ways in which Israel hinders Palestinian 
economic development, including severe restrictions on water, agriculture, and fishing 
and restrictions on production, marketing, industry, unionization, banking, and land use. 
Israel’s damaging tax policies and continued illegal acquisition of Palestinian land 
through settlements also damage Palestinian prosperity. 
Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank are decried as devastating to the 
Palestinian economy in Sara Roy’s The Gaza Strip, the Political Economy of De-
Development, B’Tselem’s Arrested Development: the Long-Term Impact of Israel’s 
Separation Barrier in the West Bank and Under the Guise of Legality: Israel’s 
Declarations of State Land in the West Bank, Raja Khalidi and Sahar Taghdisi-Rad’s The 
Economic Dimensions of Prolonged Occupation: Continuity and Change in Israeli Policy 
Towards the Palestinian Economy, and the United Nations Seminar on Assistance to the 
Palestinian People’s The Economic Cost of Continued Israeli Occupation of the 
Palestinian Territory; Local, Regional, and International Efforts Towards Mitigating it. 
While ostensible “security” in Israel and the Occupied Territories may appear improved 
since Oslo, the conflict has not. Palestinian frustration with disenfranchisement continues 
to boil under increased Israeli pressure. The Rand Corporation, in Building a Successful 
Palestinian State and The Palestine Studies Project’s The State of Palestine: Suggested 
Guidelines for Comprehensive Development, cites the necessity of economic 
development for a successful Palestinian state. 
                                                 
11 Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, Israeli Obstacles to Economic Development in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. 2nd Edition (Jerusalem: The Latin Patriarchate Printing Press, April 
1994), 7.  
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The 1994 Oslo Accords were an attempt to absolve Israel of direct blame for the 
occupation and eventually establish a Palestine that would provide its own security and 
act as an autonomous nation-state with no further claims on Israel. However, the critical 
flaw in these efforts was the assumption that Palestine, whose borders are controlled by 
Israel, can flourish without explicit Israeli support—in other words, that the fates of 
Palestine and Israel are not intertwined. George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning write 
in After Oslo, 
The conscientiousness which led to the peace process can be deciphered 
through the images of the vision. This consciousness is concerned solely 
with the fulfillment of the Zionist dream on both the political and cultural 
levels. Peace was considered the end of a long nightmare, not for the 
Palestinians but for Israeli Jews. It enabled the liberal circles who 
supported the process to re-establish the self-image of Zionism as a pure 
and just entity. The vision was never build on the principles of partnership 
and equal rights; it did not include a vision of living together. Many 
Israelis honestly believed that the agreement would bring relief and 
sovereignty to the Palestinians. They truly regarded the process as the end 
of the occupation. Yet, they did not develop an attitude which regarded the 
Palestinian question as an inseparable part of their context.12 
For Israel, trade and market interests are subordinate to political objectives in 
Palestine. It is because of this historically peripheral status that economics now requires 
particular consideration as a tangible way to make both peoples visible to one another. 
Yet, nowhere is it argued that an effective peace agreement must be based on something 
less alienating than power politics. While the Arab Peace Initiative and the Israeli Peace 
Initiative propose that motivations in the form of economic gains be put on the table, they 
fail to address the current weakness of financial incentive. Meanwhile, reports like the 
IVK Pax Christi’s Analyzing Israel’s Economic Policy Towards Palestine suggest that a 
political solution is required before economic cooperation can begin, without addressing 
the current lack of political will. 
While market interests have little to no bearing on political will, the military 
certainly does, according to Jonathan Nitzen and Shimon Bichler in The Global Political 
                                                 
12 George Giacaman and Jorund Dag Lonnning, After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (West 
Randolph, Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), 64. 
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Economy of Israel. Nitzen and Bichler redefine Marx’s “capital” as sourced in power, 
rather than wealth, asserting that power generates wealth, rather than the reverse. In their 
analysis, the Israeli military is the loudest voice in Israeli politics and is concerned with 
accumulating and retaining power capital. High-market consolidation, meanwhile, stifles 
free-market competition and the emergence of private enterprise and solidifies a crony-
capitalist relationship between businessmen and the political elite—who are 
predominately elected from the upper ranks of the military. 
Interpreting Israel’s policies, Neve Gordon uses Michel Foucault’s notion of 
disciplinary “biopower,” or the rise of “population,” that is, diminution of the individual 
by the state, as the theoretical backdrop for Israel’s occupation. Gordon argues that the 
contradictions apparent in Israel’s policy spring from the excesses of Israel’s control.  
By excess I mean effects that are not part of the initial objective of the 
means of control. A curfew restricts and confines the population, but also 
produces antagonism; the establishment of a Jewish settlement on a hilltop 
is used to confiscate land, partition space, and monitor the Palestinian 
villages below, but also underscores that the occupation is not 
temporary.13  
This book makes a convincing argument as to why there is more to Israel’s deeply 
contradictory policy than rational-choice theory can describe. 
In The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation: Repression beyond 
Exploitation, Shir Hever argues that Israel’s political paralysis in addressing the conflict 
is due to the internal contradictions of the early Zionist movement. He writes, “From its 
earliest days, the Zionist movement failed to come to grips with the fact that the land of 
Palestine was already inhabited, and that is population is not Jewish. This has led Zionist 
leaders to pursue conflicting agendas and focus on short-term planning.”14 
Although economic cooperation surfaces in political rhetoric from Mandatory 
Palestine to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speeches, it has no practical significance in 
Israel’s current political context and strategic vision. As the literature suggests, the Arab–
                                                 
13 Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 16. 
14 Hever, The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation, 87. 
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Israeli–Palestinian conflict is centered on identity politics, supported by economics. 
Overemphasis on either the conflict’s nationalist or economic aspects obscures its dual 
nature. 
C. ISRAEL’S ECONOMY: UNSUITED FOR COMMERCIAL PEACE 
Apart from the challenges posed by Israel’s political economy, Israel’s market 
structure is particularly unconducive to integrating Palestinian markets and building the 
Palestinian economy. Shir Hever suggests the two economies are adverse to integration 
because, in essence, they are already a single economic entity stratified by varying 
privileges and rights. Whether they are seen as two economies or one, Israeli-Palestinian 
economic rights and privileges and skilled and unskilled labor tend to be bifurcated along 
ethnic and religious lines.15 Demographically, the Haredi, Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians 
suffer from poor education and, consequently, employment opportunity, in a global, 
innovative economy characterized by income disparity.16 As Press-Barnathan and 
McDonald assert, equality in terms of rights, power, and leverage is critical for economic 
peace.  
The gross demographic disparities between the Israeli and Palestinian populations 
mean that not only is the labor market unattractive for Israeli business, but that Palestine 
has very little to bargain with economically. Still, Israeli business might find a way to 
capitalize on Palestinian markets if there were not a second problem: Israel has little free 
enterprise. Israel is characterized by high market consolidation, outlined in a variety of 
sources from Paul Rivlin to Bichler and Nitzan, which limits entrepreneurial access to 
capital. This explains why Israel’s economic policy is so dominated by public lobby 
groups, from the military to the Haredi. Lobbyists who represent business, like the Israeli 
Peace Initiative, have little sway in Israel’s political economy since the strongest of 
Israel’s business interests cannot be disentangled from Israel’s political elite. 
An examination of the literature on Israel’s economy and political economy, 
coupled with literature on economic-peace theory, provides a reason why Israel’s 
                                                 
15 Hever, The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation 5. 
16 Rivlin, Paul, “The Israeli Economy” (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012), 7. 
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occupation of Palestine is not about economics and why economic incentive has failed to 
lay the groundwork for a peace agreement. Israel’s political and market economy is run 
by special interests, from the military to a few financial groups that represent the majority 
of the Tel Aviv stock exchange. Subject to different forces, the economic dynamics of 
this conflict will inevitably change, for better or worse. Because economics drives, and is 
driven by, political will, economics is fundamental to any calculation of peace. 
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II. NATIONALISM VS. RATIONAL MATERIALISM 
The tragedy of Israel’s public security debate is that we don’t realize that 
we face a frustrating situation in which we win every battle but lose the 
war. 
— Ami Ayalon, head of Shin Bet 1995–200017 
The clash of interests and ideologies between ethnic groups “trapped” in 
one state is the material from which the protracted ethnic conflicts are 
made.18 
      —Eiki Berg and Guy Ben-Porat18 
 
James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank from 1995 until 2005, observed, 
“I don’t think that a state of Palestine will be based on anything other than investment.”19 
Wolfensohn assumed that rational interest could steer the conflict to more manageable 
waters. It is appealing to think that the conflict might be transformed from a zero-sum 
game to a Nashian compromise by way of Smith’s “invisible hand”—all Palestinians 
need is a homeland with viable opportunity, all Israel needs is to be recognized and stop 
being terrorized. Could there be a win–win? Perhaps, if the recent past—not the medieval 
past, where Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived peacefully together in old Palestine—but 
the horrific, humiliating past of the 20th century could be laid to rest, there could be. 
However, grievance in the Arab–Israeli Conflict is a living thing. Nationalism, which 
drove the Zionist enterprise and drives Israeli political ideology today, is inherently 
ethnocentric: it derives meaning, depth, and force from contrast with the other. To what 
extent the fervor of Palestinian nationalism, in many respects Israeli nationalism’s mirror 
image, would subside if the economic casus belli were removed remains unknown, 
because economic regeneration in Palestine remains as elusive as the peace itself. 
                                                 
17 Dror Moreh, Director, The Gatekeepers (2012). 
18 Eiki Berg and Guy Ben-Porat, “Introduction: Partition vs. Power Sharing,” Nations and 
Nationalism 14 (2008): 31. 
19  James Wolfensohn, (October 2008) interview by Felice Freidson, “Wolfensohn Looks Back: What 
Went Wrong,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jyW-JXlD2lw. 
 16
Two years before Wolfensohn began his term, the freshly negotiated Oslo 
Accords created what seemed to be a framework on which to build a healthy relationship 
between the two nations. For the first time, a serious attempt was made to formalize an 
Israeli economic policy toward Palestine—partly since it was the first negotiation in 
which an independent Palestine was considered. A subset of the Oslo agreement, the 
1994 “Paris Protocol,” states the importance of economics: 
The two parties view the economic domain as one of the cornerstones in 
their mutual relations with a view to enhance their interest in the 
achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. Both parties shall 
cooperate in this field in order to establish a sound economic base for 
these relations of mutual respect of each other’s economic interests, 
reciprocity, equity and fairness.20 
Twenty years later, however, a cooperative economic basis on which to establish 
mutual respect seems unreachable, much less a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace. In 
2005, the U.S. Institute of Peace observed, “Increasingly, Israelis are opting for 
guarantees for their personal security (the fence) and the Jewish nature of the state 
(unilateral withdrawal) over the aspiration to ‘end the conflict.’”21 The rise of Hamas, 
anti-Israeli violence, and the lack of improvement in Israeli–Arab relations seem to signal 
that the protocol’s economic path to peace is no more than another dead-end. Despite 
investment, Palestinians appear resistant to progress.22  
The reality, however, is more complex. A study conducted by the World Bank in 
1999 found that Israel engaged in protectionism, levied disproportionately high taxes on 
Palestinian goods, and severely restricted Palestinian trade with other Arab states.23  
James Wolfensohn witnessed Israel’s economic anti-cooperation firsthand. In 
2005, he was invited by President Sharon to supervise the transfer of assets in Gaza to the 
                                                 
20  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Gaza-Jericho Agreement,” www.mfa.gov (1994). 
21 Yossi Alpher, The Future of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Critical Trends Affecting Israel. 
Special Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September  2005), 5.  
22 Mazul Mualem, “Netanyahu to PA; Israel Boycott is Only Hurting Yourselves” Haaretz, May 24, 
2012.  
23 Ephraim Lavie, “The Israeli-Palestinian Economic Agreement and Current Consequences,” Edited 
by Paul Rivlin and Yitzhat Gal, Middle East Economy 3 (2013). 
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Palestine Authority and act as a mediator in negotiations between Israel and Palestine on 
transit routes and other economic-development activities in Gaza.24 Wolfensohn raised 
$9 billion to bolster the Palestinian economy. His commitment to the project even 
included $500,000 of his own investment toward greenhouse agricultural production in 
the Gaza strip. Despite these efforts, the project shriveled on the vine. Wolfensohn 
recalls: 
I remember seeing the greenhouses with the chairman [Abbas] and 
looking at the fruits and everything, and there was a joyous atmosphere: 
“Boy, we’re about to get this thing going and we’re going to have hotels 
by the beaches and we’re going to have tourism and it’s going to be 
fantastic, and the Palestinians really know how to be hosts.” But in the 
months afterward, first of all Arik [Sharon] became ill and the current 
prime minister came in, and there was a clear change of view…Instead of 
hope, the Palestinians saw that they were put back in prison. And with 50 
percent unemployment, you would have conflict. This is not just a 
Palestinian issue. If you have 50 percent of your people with no work, 
chances are they will become annoyed. So it’s not, in my opinion, that 
Palestinians are so terrible; it is that they were in a situation where a 
modulation of views between one and the other became impossible.25 
The structure of Israeli politics is at least partly to blame. Israel’s coalition 
government seems to be determined by domestic issues rather than issues related to 
Palestine or peace. Thomas Freidman observed in From Beirut to Jerusalem, “Whereas in 
Lebanon the cabinet was ineffectual because it represented no one, in Israel the cabinet 
was ineffectual because it represented everyone.”26 When politicians who work toward 
economic cooperation do manage to consolidate support, their good ideas seem to wither 
without constant tending, as Wolfensohn’s experience demonstrates. Oslo’s rhetoric 
echoes in statements by Prime Minister Netanyahu, such as:  
We must weave an economic peace alongside a political process. That 
means that we have to strengthen the moderate parts of the Palestinian 
                                                 
24 Shahar Smooha, “All the Dreams we had are now Gone,” Haaretz, July 19, 2007. 
25 Smooha, “Dreams now Gone,”1-3. 
26 Thomas Freidman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Random House, 1990), 253. 
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economy by handing rapid growth in those areas, rapid economic growth 
that gives a stake for peace for the ordinary Palestinian.27  
But little has changed since 1992, when the Center for Engineering and Planning 
for the Palestine Studies Project concluded,  
Above all, industrial development has been constrained by the absence of 
a national strategy which identifies objectives and denies direction, and 
the reluctance to make significant investments in industry due to the 
uncertainty and lack of stability resulting from the prevailing political 
situation.28  
Yet, considering the acknowledged importance of economics in international 
relations, state formation, and ties between the structural power of capital, GDP, and 
politics, it is remarkable that economics never overcame the gridlock to become a central 
issue, rather than a talking point. Even after good economic intentions had been freshly 
proclaimed in the 1994 protocol, economic progress in Gaza lagged deplorably for 
several months.  
Early warnings by Israeli and other experts that “Palestinian anger is 
stoked by poverty” were ignored, as were arguments by Israeli economists 
that “For growth, the Palestinians must have open borders with 
Israel…[because] if you separate them [the two economies], one of them 
will die and it is obvious that that one will be the Palestinian economy.”29  
Sara Roy argues in The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development 
that Israel’s apparent hesitation to jumpstart the Palestinian economy is not attributable to 
corruption or a lackadaisical attitude, but to Israeli strategies that actively handicap 
growth in Gaza and have resulted from social resistance to the idea of integration. Roy 
writes of Israeli policy toward Gaza since 1967,  
For better or worse, Israel never sought to promote the interaction of 
Palestinian society with its own, and through such interaction, to educate 
and “enlighten” Palestinians. It did not even seek to exploit the 
Palestinians for economic gain, although that did occur. Rather, it sought 
                                                 
27 R. Ahren, “Netanyahu: Economics, not Politics is the Key to Peace,” Haaretz, November 21, 2008. 
28 Palestine Studies Project, Masterplanning: the State of Palestine, Suggested Guidelines for 
Comprehensive Development (Ramallah: Center for Engineering and Planning, 1992), 49. 
29 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents (Boston: 
Bedford/St. Martins, 2001), 441.   
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primarily to dispossess the Arabs of their economic and political resources 
with the ultimate aim of removing them from the land, making possible 
the realization of the ideological goal of building a strong, exclusively 
Jewish state.30 
Ian Lustick concurs: 
The decision of the government not to push hard for the economic 
development of the Arab sector was largely based on a desire to prevent 
the emergence of Arab-owned centers of economic power. The attitude of 
the Military Administration, for example, toward economic development 
was that it should be “carried out in such a way as not to create a self-
contained Arab economy, for this would encourage hostile activity.”31 
Taken at face value, the cooperative rhetoric used in Oslo conflicts with the 
reality of Israel’s actions in the occupied territories. The plaintive question asked is, 
“Why has the implementation of commercial peace always seemed to fail?” A better 
question is, “Why has the implementation of commercial peace always lacked allure?”  
Amin Hewedy, the Egyptian former minister of defense and chief of general 
intelligence writes:  
Shortly before his death in 1904, Theodor Herzl [the modern conceptual 
founder of Israel] wrote about the dangers besetting the future state of 
Israel at its inception, dangers which may also prove to be the cause of its 
demise. He focused on two chief dangers and cautioned future generations 
to avoid them. The dangers emanated from what he termed men of 
religion and the men of war. Herzl noted that on concluding the 
performance of their respective roles in establishing the state, both sides 
will attempt to gain control over it. He went on to state that should that 
happen, the secular fundamentals on which the state was build would 
collapse completely. For these reasons, he believed it necessary to confine 
the rabbis to the synagogues, just as the military should be limited to the 
barracks.32 
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Herzl’s fears have been realized. Not only has secular national identity been 
weakened by increasingly pervasive religious ideology, Israel’s military-industrial 
complex has become ubiquitous in the economic and political sphere. Most alarming, 
however, is the apparent alliance of the men of war with the men of religion in a 
decision-making process that is “unplanned, intensely political, informal, and led by a 
prime minister who rules at the mercy of his party and his coalition, and is driven by the 
military, which holds a monopoly on policymaking.”33 To understand this 
transformation, and its significance, it is necessary to begin at Israel’s beginning. 
A. IMAGINING ISRAEL 
If nation-states are widely conceded to be “new” and “historical,” the 
nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an 
immemorial past, and still more important, glide into a limitless future.  
—Benedict Anderson34 
Whether or not it happened one way or another, no memory has a country, 
no country has a memory. I can remember or invent a memory, and at the 
same time invent a country or think that in the past it was different. There 
is no country that can be different if it was first not different. 
—Yoram Kaniuk, 194835 
If rational, material interests guided the conflict, it probably would never have 
begun at all, and if such interests guided the conflict today, it would be far easier to 
solve—hence the current appeal of economic peace among political leaders and 
institutions. But the majority of writing on the Arab–Israeli conflict focuses on politics 
because, to begin with, Israel was not founded as a mere business venture, although 
prosperity has always been a key part of Israel’s welfare. The motivation was a dream: 
the dream of a Jewish nation-state.  
                                                 
33 Freilich, Charles D. Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy, Cornell 
University Press, 2012, quoted by Aluf Benn in “Israel’s Warlords: How the Military Rules in War and 
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The formation of this nation-state tells us two things. First, that the ethnic 
exclusiveness of this nation-state was antithetical to broad economic integration with the 
native Arab population. Second, that although the transformation of Israel’s nationalism 
suggests that the Israeli identity is in constant flux (what Adam Garfinkle calls an 
“autogenic dialectical relationship”) the religious character of this change, which tends to 
be non-negotiable and passionately felt, has made a resolution more elusive over the last 
decades.36  
While economic cooperation was unattractive before Israel was officially 
recognized because it ran counter to socialist goals that sought to establish a distinct, 
majority-Jewish, agriculturally-based economy, once Jewish majority cities were 
established around a high-technology, post-industrial economy, Israel’s relationship to 
the land altered, as did the reasons Israel remained resistant to economic cooperation. The 
early Zionists optimistically believed that a solution would be found in the future, but that 
the imperative of the hour was to create a Jewish homeland. Today, Israel is unclear 
about her ambitions. Military success and a large influx of Orthodox believers have 
blurred the horizon. As ownership of the land waned in economic importance, it waxed in 
emotional significance. Increasingly, Palestine, and then Israel, were seen not just as a 
rural piece of earth, subject to possible colonization, but as the sacred, God-given lands 
of ancient prophesy. 
Although the religious aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict dominate popular 
imagination, the men who founded Israel were secular, influenced by the rising, global 
tide of modern state nationalism. These Zionists, as they called themselves, were affected 
by nationalism in two ways. They witnessed the racism it generated toward European and 
Russian Jewry, and they used it as the inspiration for their own Jewish nation-state. 
Rather than tolerate persecution in their places of birth, these intellectual, secular Jews 
settled upon the region of Palestine as a culturally significant, rather than primarily 
religiously symbolic, place to take root. However, even as nationalism successfully 
created culturally and economically cohesive states in Europe, its excesses fueled the 
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world wars. Likewise, Jewish nationalism has in many ways led to Israel’s success by 
uniting a diverse population under an exclusive banner. Yet the strength of the Jewish-
Israeli identity has come at the cost of a persistent, intractable problem—it was 
antithetical to the embrace of the Other—the native Arabs inhabiting the majority of the 
land. 
Today, secular Zionist nationalism has given way to a religious nationalism that 
has rewritten Israel’s narrative, obfuscated the fundamentally modern nature of the 
conflict, and propagated the idea that the conflict is insoluble because it manifests the 
clash between two immutable identities. U.S. presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s 2012 
address to Israel, “As I come here and I look out over this city and consider the 
accomplishments of the people of this nation, I recognize the power of at least culture and 
a few other things,” represents this lack of nuance.37 Before the resurgence of Modern 
Hebrew between 1890 and 1914, widely attributed to Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, the nation of 
Israel shared neither a common tongue, nor even a common faith, as most Zionists were 
secular atheists.38 The evolution of Israeli culture is indeed remarkable, but, like any 
identity, it is both fluid and self-referential. The recent emergence of religious-ethnic 
nationalism bodes poorly for the prospect of economic peace because it frames the 
conflict in terms of the metaphysical, undermining the rational, materialist elements in 
both Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms.39 
Identity politics is particularly important for Jewish Israelis because, unlike the 
United States, to which in popular media and politics it often has been compared, Israel is 
an ultra-modern state and a state with an ancient memory.40 In the way it was and is 
imagined, Israel has as much to do with its prehistory than its existence post-1949. Alfred 
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Balfour, architect of the Balfour Declaration, infamously wrote to Lord Curzon in 1919, “The 
four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is 
rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the 
desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.”41Ancient 
history is not only a backdrop to how Israel was imagined abroad, Israel’s own self-
image, whether of secular or religious hue, is shaped by a long, often-horrific history of 
racial and ethnic persecution. “While Americans can’t easily remember the past, Jews 
can’t easily forget it.”42  
This collective memory extends to the Diaspora, which has yielded vast influence 
in Israel’s domestic and international politics. In the early 90s, for example, there were 
more Jews in the New York City metropolitan area than in Israel.43 To make matters 
more complicated, Jewish identity collapses religion and ethnicity.  
There are Israeli citizens who are not Jews—about 17 per cent are Arabs, 
mostly Muslim but many Christian—but clearly Israel is a self-described 
Jewish state and was created as such. Jews can be set in distinction to 
Muslim, in which case one is contrasting religion, and Jew can just as 
ready be set in distinction to Arab, in which case one is contrasting 
ethnicity.44  
This loose categorization of the Jewish ethnic and religious identity makes Israeli 
nationalism a particularly persistent obstruction to the embrace of a multicultural, fully 
secular state. Not only are Jews different from Arabs ethnically, they are, by default, 
different in terms of faith, and both of these differences have a significant impact on 
perception of identity and identity politics. 
The single thing the U.S. and Israel fully share is they both came into being by 
declaration, not, as the older powers have, through organic political evolution over 
centuries. For Israel’s founders, creating Israel, an idea that originated from the 
confidence and idealism of 19th-century continental philosophy, was a radical and 
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proactive solution to the long, torturous, and cruel history of Jewish persecution. The 
term “Zionism,” from the Hebrew Tziyon or “Jerusalem,” emerged in the 1890s to 
describe a new Jewish nationalism.45 Unlike religious groups such as the modern Israeli 
Hasidim, many of the original Zionist thinkers were, like Karl Marx himself, informed by 
their Jewish identity but highly secular, universalist, and idealistic.  
The Zionists’ essentially revolutionary purpose was to create a socialist, 
egalitarian, agrarian, industry-heavy society, completely free of the political and 
economic constraints of Europe and Russia. In Europe and the East, the Diaspora had 
been granted some new freedoms under growing European secularism, but continued to 
suffer political and social marginalization. European and Russian Jewry were limited to 
bourgeois ambitions—service enterprises like moneylending, petty trade, and academia.46 
Zionists not only saw opportunities in agriculture and industry as essential to the 
economic liberation of Jews from Russian and European anti-Semitism, but viewed 
bourgeois and intellectual occupations as parasitic and morally bankrupt.47 “The key to 
normalizing the Jewish social structure was agriculture, and the soil of Eretz Israel 
seemed to most to have almost magical powers of healing and spiritual renewal.”48 The 
land, therefore, was not only imbued by Zionists with ideological significance, but with 
economic import. 
The land they settled upon, Palestine, described a geographic area within the 
region of Syria under Ottoman rule from the year 1516 until the end of the First World 
War. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire redefined the region. Under the new British 
mandate designated by the League of Nations from 1920 to 1948, Palestine’s formal 
political and economic borders solidified around a population that was still majority Arab 
and minority Jewish.49 For Jews, this region, known in Hebrew as Eretz Yisra’el, has 
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always been sacred, yet orthodox Jews believed only God could restore their ancestral 
homeland. 
For the few Jews who lived in Palestine, as for virtually all Jews before 
the modern era, only the end of history as manifested in the coming of the 
messiah could bring about the termination of “exile” and its attendant 
sufferings, the redemption of the Jews, and their restoration to the land 
which God had promised to their ancestors but from which they had—also 
by divine decree —been uprooted.50  
Secular Zionism, however, was free of religious solemnity. Between 1850 and 
1950, “Zionist ideology congealed, and it did so in the direction of socialist, or labor 
Zionism. It borrowed heavily from the socialist ideologies then most popular among 
intellectual classes in Europe. The elements of this ideology are extremely important to 
grasp, for they have carved out a deep legacy in modern Israel.”51 The historical land of 
Israel, however, served as a rallying point for the Diaspora and Christian supporters. “The 
founding fathers of modern Zionism and the State of Israel were almost all of them 
atheists or religiously indifferent, although their legitimization of the Zionist enterprise in 
the biblical narrative and record was always a powerful driving force to gain national 
support.”52  
Ironically, the Zionists’ vision of a bucolic, egalitarian society for persecuted 
Jews required a regime of social marginalization for non-Jews; imposing the very 
dynamic Jews were seeking to escape in the West on a new Other. Yet this contradiction 
was ignored by Zionists and the majority of late 19th century socialists.  
Before the First World War, relatively few socialists opposed colonialism 
in principle or rejected its underlying premises, and most shared with their 
avowed class enemies a firm belief in the superiority of European 
civilization and the consequent right (if not duty) of Europeans to rule 
over less advanced peoples.53  
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Early Zionists, like Ber Borkov, justified colonialism through an elaboration of 
Marxism. In his 1905 publication, “The National Question and the Class Struggle,” he 
extended the Marxist concepts of “relations of production” and “forces of production” to 
include “conditions of production,” laying a foundation for an argument that national 
territory was prerequisite to the ultimate goal of socialist revolution. Like other Marxists 
of the Second International, Borokov viewed history as an inexorable force driven by 
mechanistic, economic, and positivist evolutionary factors, as opposed to individual 
human will or agency. His theories were intended for his Jewish anti-Zionist critics, 
including almost all the Jewish-Russian socialists, who saw Zionism as a reactionary 
distraction from the impending Russian revolution, and from the Bund, the independent 
Jewish socialist party popular in Eastern Europe, which denounced Zionists for 
acquiescing in the European and Russian premise that Jews and non-Jews were incapable 
of living together as equals.54 
Like Borokov, Asher Ginsberg, an influential Hebrew essayist and publicist of 
Hibbat Tziyon, acknowledged the issue of the local population, although he still called 
for Jewish settlement. After a visit to Palestine in 1891, he derided Jewish settlers for 
treating the locals with distain and even cruelty. However, mention of the natives was 
more often omitted altogether. Early Zionists like Theodor Herzl, Nachman Syrkin, and 
Max Nordeau simply rendered the Palestinian population invisible.55 Zachary Lockman 
argues that the general exclusion of the native people from Zionist discourse was not due 
to lack of awareness of their presence (although some Zionist writers had never been to 
Palestine and may have been ignorant if their presence). Rather, it better served Zionist 
purposes to view the land in terms of lacking a people, a group with a distinctive national 
identity56—if not in the literal sense of lacking inhabitants, as the famous “a land without 
a people for a people without a land” might suggest. This characterization became the 
genesis and crux of the present dispute. Charles Kamen writes in Little Common Ground, 
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“As subsequent events have shown, the basic dilemmas resulting from the joint claims of 
Arabs and Jews to the same territory have not yet been resolved.”57  
Without having visited Palestine, Ber Borokov also believed that the local 
population would cooperate economically with the influx of Jews. Like Ginsberg, his 
solution to the two-people, one-land dilemma was regional economic growth to benefit 
all. He wrote:  
The inhabitants of Eretz Yisra’el will adapt themselves to the economic 
and cultural type that seizes a dominant economic position in the country. 
The natives of Eretz Yisra’el will assimilate economically and culturally 
with whoever brings order to the country, whoever undertakes the 
development of the forces of production of Eretz Yisra’el. 
He concludes:  
It is the Jewish immigrants who will undertake the development of the 
forces of production of Eretz Yisra’el and the local population of Eretz 
Yisra’el will soon assimilate economically and culturally to the Jews.58  
Borokov’s reasoning has a haunting resemblance to defense minister Moshe 
Dayan’s belief that “economic development and better living conditions would replace 
the Palestinian desire for political rights.”59 
Yet, Borokov and other Zionists’ own beliefs suggest that he partly was right. 
Identity, even the ancient Hebrew identity, is subject to influence by a socio-
economically dominant society, as the influence of European assumptions about social 
hierarchy on Zionist thinking would suggest. Practically speaking, the Zionists made no 
attempts to integrate Palestinians into their private enterprises or otherwise include the 
native Arabs in the benefits of Jewish-led prosperity. If they had, perhaps the Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza might be more moderate today. In 2013, according to Gallup, 
just 20 percent of Jewish Israelis strongly supported a return to the negotiating table, 
compared with 32 percent of Gazans and 63 percent of West Bankers. The largest 
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majority in favor of reopening the peace process, at 63 percent, are Arab Israelis, the only 
Arab group that shares the benefits of the majority-Jewish Israeli economy and political 
system.60  
Amos Nadan in The Palestinian Peasant Economy Under the Mandate: A Story of 
Colonial Bungling, argues that Jewish immigration had a net-zero effect on economic 
growth in the mandate region while Jacob Metzer and Oden Kaplan only contend in 
Mesheq yehudi u-mesheq ‘aravi beerez ishrael: Tozar, ta’asuqa u-ezmihah betqufat 
hamandat that the net growth rate in Palestine was due to the “spillover effects” of 
Jewish land sales and Jewish innovation into the “Arab economy.”61  
Resident Arabs quickly recognized the symbolic significance of Jewish land 
acquisition, even while its effects were still marginal. As a result of their exclusion under 
Jewish nationalism, Palestinians began to develop their own.62 In a second trip in 1911, 
Ginsberg warned readers of a growing national consciousness among Palestinians that 
would make land acquisition more difficult for Jews.63 Just as Jews formed an ethnic 
nationalism in response to Western oppression, Arabs began to create an ethnic 
nationalism in response to marginalization by Jews. While still under Ottoman rule, local 
journalists warned of the potential danger from the rural population of land purchases, 
before much displacement had actually occurred.64 By the mandate period, Arabs began 
to respond to immigration with increasingly violent protest. In response, the Jewish labor 
movement created its own defense force, which became the foundation for the Israeli 
army. Prophetically, state protection evolved from economic protection.65 Politically, 
meanwhile, Zionists casually dismissed Arab claims to a Palestinian national identity. 
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Historical writing and research typically sees the ensuing conflict between the two 
groups from either Israeli or Palestinian perspective and cites a “dual society,” including 
a dual economy. Zachary Lockman argues that these views are subjective and partly due 
to scholars’ tendency to speak either Hebrew or Arabic, but not both. More importantly, 
the history of each side is deeply political.  
Without suggesting perfect symmetry between the two sides, it is 
nonetheless the case that the grip of mythologized national pasts on both 
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs has until very recently been quite 
strong, making it difficult even for those historians who regard themselves 
as fully committed to the norms of objective scholarship to transcend, or 
even perceive, the nationalist filters through which they understood the 
past. Moreover, on both sides’ perceptions of day-to-day experience, 
especially the threat or reality of hostility and violence by members of the 
other group, have served to constantly reconfirm and give new strength to 
the dominant nationalist narratives, adherence to which thereby becomes a 
matter of both common sense and survival.66  
Identity on both sides has been made a tangible thing: The Israeli identity is 
vested with certain material rights, the Palestinian identity is marked by divestment of 
material rights. In any political discussion of economic peace, these differences in 
material reality are as important as the dollar amount of investment, the exchange rate, or 
access to channels of international trade; in many ways, identity is the summation of a 
range of economic disparities.  
But identity is the most difficult thing to penetrate. The material reality attached 
to identity serves to reify it. For example, an Israeli passport is a signifier of being an 
Israeli: it is a material reality that gives meaning to the idea of being “Israeli.”  Likewise, 
while it is easy to claim the influence of “nationalism,” which describes a course of 
action, it is hard to comprehensively describe a “nation,” which describes an idea.67 A 
nation’s complexion, as Benedict Anderson noted, is an amalgamation of the imaginings 
of its people.68 Economic interaction, far from existing in a vacuum, is seen through the 
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prism of identity. A negative exchange between fellow compatriots may be dismissed as 
an exception, while a positive exchange between a perceived enemy may be viewed as 
manipulative, etc. What begins as an idea can quickly become a reality as the perception 
of interaction forms the basis of further exchange. 
For a century, economic interaction between Palestinians and Israelis has reified 
ethnic and national difference. Rights, power, and voice have been delineated by identity. 
Differences that were once slight in Old Jerusalem have become monstrous: as seen in 
the increasing division between east and west quarters. The challenge for economic peace 
is to create a context that is free of identity politics and nationalism, a clearing where 
these powerful abstractions are left at the door in favor of personal material and economic 
interests.  
If a nation truly is a kind of factory of the imagination, there is no reason why it 
cannot be retooled. Israel is the ultimate example of a nation that was built on an idea. In 
its dramatic birth, Israelis boldly forged ahead into an unknown. Yoram Kaniuk writes in 
1948, “When we were awakened we were sent off to fight another battle and again we 
forgot why, and that was the funniest thing that happened to me in the war, that I 
established a state while asleep and dancing the hora next to an unknown comrade who’d 
been sliced into two.”69  
B. A CENTURY OF “ECONOMIC COOPERATION” DOUBLETALK 
Nahum Goldmann, a prominent member of Israel’s 1950s political scene, once 
proposed that Israel become the “Middle Eastern Switzerland,” peaceful with the U.S., 
the USSR, and its Arab neighbors. His vision of peace ruled by economics was shared by 
many of his predecessors and contemporaries, and will likely remain a hope in the 
decades to come. 
In his early years, Goldmann believed that a resolution between Israel and 
Palestine leading to economic peace could only be imposed by the United States.70 
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However, like Britain, the U.S. has proven incapable of crafting a lasting agreement, 
probably because the sources of the conflict are never addressed.71 Palestinian 
nationalism, increasingly of a religious hue, is a red herring the Palestinians have too 
often headlined in the most reactionary ways, obfuscating the material reality of the 
conflict. If ethnically-aligned nationalism is the seed of the conflict, economic disparity is 
the soil in which it takes root. Moreover, while nationalism cannot be ignored, like 
fundamentalism, it cannot be negotiated directly. Twenty years have passed since the 
Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre found that the conflict was not exclusively 
ethno-religious and rather,  
…is, above all, territorial. With the failure of the international community 
to pressurize Israel to implement the host of international resolutions 
adopted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council…consequences of 
the Israeli military occupation have gone largely unchecked and 
unhindered for the past 25 years.72  
However, Israel’s political relations with the Arab world have stalled because 
Israel is sometimes unable, sometimes unwilling, to address the economic causes of 
Palestinian grievance.  
A review of early Arab–Jewish economic interaction clarifies the material aspect 
of the conflict; however, although the rhetoric around economic cooperation remains 
remarkably the same, the stakes have changed. Nationalism and emotional attachment 
have encroached on the material rationales for land acquisition, and these interests cannot 
be satiated by mere increases in production or GDP. A shift by all interested parties in 
perception of land from symbol to economic entity, although it certainly is both, would 
help simplify the conflict and allow for a solution. Israel/Palestine’s early history makes 
it clear that economics has always played a role in the conflict’s political development.  
Palestine’s early historical records make it clear that resident Arabs’ fundamental 
grievance was that Jewish immigration posed a direct threat to their livelihood. In 1939, 
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Britain, the imperial mediator in the region, appointed the Shaw Commission to 
investigate the reason for an outbreak of Arab riots. As might be expected, the 
commission found “racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the 
disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic 
future.” As the Jewish Virtual Library summarizes, “The report claimed that the Arabs 
feared economic domination by a group who seemed to have, in their perspective, 
unlimited funding from abroad.”73 While Jewish–Israeli nationalism was solidified by 
economic exclusion in Europe, Palestinian nationalism congealed over their economic 
exclusion by the Jews. Thus, the conflict is primarily based on economic marginalization, 
from which the virulence of ethnic nationalism sprang only later. 
Following a string of British-appointed commissions that examined Palestine’s 
agricultural capability, the position of director of Palestinian development was created 
and filled by Lewis French. French’s 1931 report recognized the impending crisis for 
those who became known as the “landless Arabs.”  
If the class of landless Arabs had to be provided for by Government on 
any scale, it is obvious that land on which they are to be settled must be 
forthcoming: and the general question at once arises where the land can be 
obtained for them, as well as for immigrant Jews.74  
The Zionists’ proposed solution was again economic. The newly establish Zionist 
advocacy group, the Jewish Agency, responded in a memo,  
Those who are anxious to provide for the future of the growing Arab 
population of Palestine can, therefore, from the economic point of view, 
do nothing better than promote Jewish immigration, capital import, and 
the technical advancement of manufacture and agriculture… the more 
rapid the pace of economic progress, the greater the total population which 
will be finally absorbed and maintained in the country.75  
This rosy, almost neo-liberal, vision of economic peace is echoed by Daniel 
Doran, founder of the Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress, public figure, and 
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political supporter and economic advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu, in his diagnosis 
of the current MENA malaise:76  
Western policymakers must refocus their attention on combating the root 
causes of Arab authoritarianism: Holding free elections in the region is 
less important than the advent of market economies. Free enterprise not 
only empowers citizens vis-à-vis the government but also facilitates 
crucial cultural, social, religious, and psychological changes conducive to 
democracy. Moreover, sustained economic growth and prosperity is the 
only proven method of bringing about true reconciliation between hated 
enemies (just look at Europe in the latter half of the twentieth century). 77 
While Doran makes the very legitimate point that the structural power of capital is 
needed to alter MENA political systems, when economic growth is driven by 
international investment and trade (as is Israel’s economy post Oslo), it tends to hollow 
out the middle class base of an economy while strengthening the minority elite.78 If the 
middle class is the prime mover in politics, economic goals should promote small 
enterprise, not simply clear the path for stronger, foreign corporations to employ a labor 
force with stymied opportunity. Certainly, Doran does not imply that this would be 
accomplished merely through foreign investment and trade. However, if the problem is 
crony capitalism and corrupt state-run corporations, how else should the market break 
free from political control?  
Also inherent in this argument is the assumption that prosperity and the growth of 
free enterprise mitigate nationalism. Examples throughout history, like the Pig War 
between pre-war Serbia and Austria, would suggest otherwise.79 Certainly, Israel’s own 
economic policy toward Palestine has embodied skepticism toward this proposition. 
While there is an important relationship between prosperity, free markets, and peace or 
conflict, the cause and correlation should not be conflated. Are markets free from 
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political-nationalist grip the mirror of a society free from nationalist casus belli? Or does 
an increase in prosperity tend to quell popular grievance? Walker Connor’s criticism of 
commercial peace is that it fails to account for a plethora of cases in which an increase in 
the prosperity of a relatively strong nation leads to an increase in nationalism. By 
contrast, there are few states that begin weaker than their neighbors for whom prosperity 
intensifies nationalism.80 Relative prosperity seems to be more important than gross 
levels of growth on both sides—perhaps an unpalatable idea to Israeli diplomats whose 
mandate is to strengthen Israeli interests in all areas.  
History shows that nationalism and economics are inextricable. In 1936, the 
Palestine Royal Commission (the Peel Commission) was charged with investigating the 
“underlying causes of the disturbances” between Jews and Arabs under the Mandate. The 
report devoted the bulk of its attention to land, supporting a policy prohibiting sales to 
Jews of Arab lands in the already-congested hill territories, and, for the first time, 
maintained that Palestine should be partitioned between the two peoples.81 The Peel 
Commission repeatedly emphasized that the rapid deterioration of the Jewish–Arab 
relationship was the direct consequence of the economic marginalization of one ethnic 
group by another. The Peel Commission observed that the crux of the conflict was both 
economic and ethnic. Political and economic marginalization always results in 
improvement or deterioration of the dynamic between groups. 
C. THE GENESIS OF A MILITARY STATE 
In the Six Day War, I was in Operations. The Arabs surrendered and we 
were suddenly left without an enemy. You’re like a dog in a race, looking 
for the rabbit. The rabbit goes underground and the dog can’t find it. We 
were like that.  
–Avaham Shalom, Head of Shin Bet 1980–1986.82 
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Ironically, although solutions through economic peace have been the latest tack 
adopted, the economic aspect of the conflict has never been more peripheral to Israeli 
politics. In the 1930s, the idea that Jewish-led prosperity could unite the territory seemed 
plausible. Today, not only has the symbolic significance of the land swelled, Israel’s 
political psychology is dramatically altered. The trauma of Jewish history, most 
significantly, the Holocaust, haunts Israel’s international relations. Fear and trauma in 
turn fuel aggression, provoking a response that fulfills assumptions—which not only 
justifies further aggression, but reinforces its arousing appeal.  
Practical Zionism in the pre-state Jewish Yishuv (community) in Palestine 
came to rely on strength and force. This was not only a result of prevailing 
circumstances but also a polar opposite and compensation for historical 
fears of destruction and ultimate loss. The reliance was highly functional 
in that it enabled a process of national independence and actualization to 
take place. However, the tension between the poles—aggression versus 
fear of annihilation—became unbearable prior to and following the events 
of the Six Day War in 1967 because of the intensification of the opposites. 
Before the war, Israelis felt their very existence threatened, while victory 
paved the way for an exalted sense of strength and power. As a 
consequence, aggression eventually came as if to assume a life of its own, 
since its connection to fear was, generally, denied, having no place in the 
collective mind.83 
This dynamic is at the core of Israel’s tendency toward jingoism, and it is an 
important one for the discussion of economic peace because it very clearly illustrates why 
prosperity without strings attached will do nothing to allay the underlying tensions on 
either side.  
The idealist’s path, embraced by the original Romantic Zionists, is also more 
difficult to sustain. Military victory has produced immediate, tangible benefits while 
economic cooperation would require the mending of political and economic relationships 
that have suffered years of abuse. As Nahum Goldmann, wrote in his autobiography, 
Israel’s 1948 military victory:  
seemed to show the advantages of direct action over negotiation and 
diplomacy…The victory offered such a glorious contrast to the centuries 
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of persecution and humiliation, of adaptation and compromise, that it 
seemed to indicate the only direction that could possibly be taken from 
then on.84  
David Ben-Gurion, perhaps the most influential of Israel’s founding fathers, was 
one of the strongest proponents of solving conflict through military dominance rather 
than negotiation. In 1948, Yaacov Shimoni, Ben-Gurion’s deputy head of the Foreign 
Ministry’s Middle East Department wrote to his superior, Elias Sasson, “[Ben-Gurion] 
seeks to solve most of the problems by military means, in such a way that no political 
negotiations and no political action would be of any value.”85 From 1948 onward, it is 
clear that, for reasons both historic and contemporary, Israel’s politics and economy have 
been centered on defense and security. 
Adding to the complexity of Jewish Israelis’ relationship with Palestinians and 
Arab Israelis, the secular Jewish nationalism on which Israel was founded has since 
transformed into a religious nationalism. A country of only six million Jews in 2012, 
Israel has absorbed three million Jewish immigrants since 1948, one million of which 
immigrated in the 1990s.86 One of the most recent additions to Israel are the Haredi, who 
primarily originate from the ex-Soviet bloc and possess very different religious, political, 
and cultural outlooks than the secular Marxist Zionists who initially founded Israel. The 
introduction of the Haredi has influenced the character of Zionist nationalism toward an 
emphasis on religious right rather than cultural superiority as the Jews’s primary claim to 
the land between the Jordan and Sinai. 
From religious fundamentalists to liberal anti-Zionists, Israel is a politically 
diverse nation. Yet all share a national identity dramatically shaped in by three things: the 
Hebrew language, Jewishness, and, perhaps most important, the land itself and the 
conflict it generates.  
From its earliest days, the Zionist movement failed to come to grips with 
the fact that the land of Palestine was already inhabited, and that its 
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population is not Jewish. This has led Zionist leaders to pursue conflicting 
agendas and focus on short-term planning.87  
This fundamental flaw in Zionist nationalism continues to dramatically influence 
all aspects of Israeli society, politics and economics included. Moshe Sharet, Israel’s 
prime minister from 1953–1955 wrote: 
In the mind of Ben-Gurion and the officers, Israel has no worries, neither 
international nor economic. The question of peace does not exist. What 
happens in the region and in the world is irrelevant. In their view, [the 
state] should see war as the principal and perhaps only means of 
increasing welfare and keeping the moral tension…[the retaliatory 
operations] are the elixir of life…They help us keep the civil and military 
tension. Without them, we wouldn’t have a fighting nation, and without a 
fighting regime we are lost.88  
The early Zionists’s pursuit of an exclusive ethnic national identity, since evolved 
into a religious-ethnic claim rather than a civic, pluralist nation-state, has set Israel on a 
jingoist course of increased division rather toward a search for common ground. Its 
evolving narrative returns to certain themes: 
As a result of Jewish self-consciousness of its own history, when the 
modern state of Israel came into being in May 1948, a new Jewish self-
image wrought by Zionism came into being with it… it mingled ancient, 
exilic, and modern elements, sometime deliberately, sometimes not. This 
image has shaped, and has itself been reshaped, by the Israeli experiment 
ever since.89 
Nationalism is an underlying factor in commercial trade and economic gain’s 
potential to improve relations between Palestine and Israel. If the focus of Arab–Israeli 
conflict has emphasized nationalism at the expense of economics, economic peace 
analysis seems to neglect nationalism. As scholars of nationalism like Walker Conner 
emphasize, perception is as important as reality.90 Stephen Howe writes: 
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The index of how much further the process of rethinking the bases of 
national history still has to go in the Middle East, is that equivalent 
concepts barely exist there yet. More liberal, inclusive and self-critical 
kinds of national history are emerging, powerfully and in great variety. 
But it may still be some time before we see a history beyond nationalism: 
one that could even in principle form the basis for both Israeli and 
Palestinian school textbooks, both sides’ TV documentaries, both sides’ 
popular self-images.91 
Yet, the very first obstacle to economic peace is not simply a matter of agreeing 
on history, it is the difficulty of putting disagreement aside. Economic cooperation is 
appealing because the pursuit of a common goal might induce both parties to put history 
aside—not forgotten, but no longer primary. Essentially, economic cooperation would 
weave new threads, one by one, into the fabric of each society. 
But where to begin? The structure of Israel’s economy is unconducive to forging 
trade or labor-based business partnerships with Palestine. In my last chapters, I will 
examine how power inequality is catastrophic for economic peace. While the idea is good 
in principle, within current conditions, economic peace as a means to improve Arab–
Palestinian–Israeli relations is not a long-term solution, if it provides any relief at all. 
Like the Oslo Accords, the elite-driven economic peace that is currently being advocated 
by political leaders and groups will not address the underlying grievances of the 




                                                 
91 Stephen Howe, “The Politics of Historical ‘Revisionism’: Comparing Ireland and Israel/Palestine,” 
Past & Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, August 2000), 253. 
 39
III. ISRAEL’S SILENT SECTOR: WHY CRIES FOR 
COOPERATION FROM ISRAEL’S CAPITALISTS ARE BARELY 
AUDIBLE 
Interests (material and Ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of 
men. Yet the “images of the world” created by these ideas have very often 
served as switches determining the tracks of which the dynamism of 
Interests kept actions moving. 
—Max Weber92 
Gradually there was an increase….to put it cynically…luckily for us, 
terrorism increased. Why do I say that? Because now we had work and we 
stopped dealing with the Palestinian State.  
—Avaham Shalom, Head of Shin Bet 1980–198693 
Nationalism notwithstanding, the biggest challenge to economic cooperation is 
embedded within Israel’s economic structure itself. The widening gulf between 
Palestinian and Israeli markets, the large role the government plays in Israel’s economic 
success, the importance of the military to political and economic decision-making, and 
the high degree of market consolidation and monopolization in Israel’s market mean that 
Israel’s market is driven by elites and dependent on elite markets with no interest in 
Palestinian investment. 
The first of these factors is the widening gap between the compositions of the 
economies. Israel’s increasing reliance on high technology and highly educated human 
capital as a proportion of GNP makes Palestine’s large, relatively unskilled labor sector 
unnecessary for the health and success of Israel’s economy. This gap is caused by the 
disparity in research and education between the two countries and the decreased demand 
for unskilled labor due, in part, to globalization. 
Since gaining independence in 1948, Israel’s population has grown from 600,000 
Jews and 150,000 Arabs to six million Jews and 1.6 million Arabs. Yet GDP per capita 
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has grown sixfold to $30,000 per person, far exceeding the rapid population increase.94 
Often thought of as the paragon of Middle Eastern economies, Israel’s export 
sophistication in the highly skilled service and technology sector gained the country entry 
in 2010 to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Paradoxically, it is this very success that harms cooperative efforts. High salaries and the 
economic demand for innovation rather than agriculture or manufacturing have made the 
untrained laborers in Israel and the young, untrained population in Palestine dispensable 
as a labor market. The disparity between skilled and unskilled labor is growing in Israel, 
with twofold effects: struggling Israelis are less likely to vote for political concessions 
that would not directly benefit them, and helping the economy of the territories by 
employing their unskilled labor is politically more difficult and unattractive than in 1994, 
when the Paris Protocol was crafted. 
As in the United States, England, and much of the developed world, Israel’s shift 
from agriculture and labor-intensive manufacturing to a services-based economy has left 
many Israelis behind in a widening income gap. Before the 1990s, low-skilled Israeli 
workers faced competition from Palestinian laborers, a practice that has since been 
restricted by barriers to border crossing. In the 2000s, Israeli workers had to compete 
with low-skilled labor imported from the Far East and through illegal immigration.95 In 
2011, 24.8 percent of the population lived in poverty, one of the highest percentages in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Israel’s Arab 
population, at 20 percent of the total, combined with the ultra-orthodox or Haredi, 
representing 8 percent of the population, are particularly vulnerable. Both Arab Muslims 
and Haredi tend to have only one wage earner per household. Women typically stay 
home and care for large families. Haredi men are exempt from military service and prefer 
to devote their careers to state-subsidized religious study.96 Arab men, even when 
qualified, face severe discrimination in the booming hi-tech sector.97Arab–Israeli 
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households also tend to be located away from urban centers like Tel Aviv, and both 
Haredi and Arab groups tend to live in discrete minority communities.98 
The problem is cyclical. Rivlin writes:  
One of the most worrying factors about this is that the younger generation 
inherits poverty because of its inadequate ultra-orthodox education system 
that concentrates on religious studies and does not provide adequate basic 
education that is the pre-condition for participation in the labor market at 
anything other than a very low skill level.99  
The same is true for opportunities among Arab children, who, along with Haredi 
children, accounted for the bulk of the 35.5 percent child poverty rate in 2011.100 
Non-specialized, assembly-style labor is costly but still necessary to some 
manufacturing, despite the innovative bent of Israel’s economy. Israel’s two main 
industrial exports (excluding services, which do not factor into GDP) are diamonds, at 
22.2 percent of export revenue, and chemicals and related products, at 23.1 percent in 
2010.101 Approximately one-third of the world’s rough diamonds pass through Israel to 
be cut and polished, and every second diamond sold in the U.S. originated in Israel. 
However, due to competition with lower-wage labor markets in India and China, Israel’s 
diamond industry has been suffering. Israel Diamond Institute’s managing director, Udi 
Sheintal, teamed up with the government in 2013 to employ Haredi by subsidizing their 
pay through a $200-million, five-year program to encourage Haredi integration into the 
workforce.102 
Because emerging economies in places like India, China, Brazil, and others have 
an abundance of cheap labor, Israel’s economy currently depends, to various degrees, on 
government reallocation of wealth from innovative, highly productive sectors to labor-
intensive industries, to maintain market competitiveness in global manufacturing. In other 
words, a large percentage of Israel’s economy is protected by government subsidy. This 
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means that developing manufacturing industries is not particularly attractive for Israeli 
entrepreneurs, because they are not inherently profitable. Thus, these industries cannot be 
functionally defined as private sector or free market.  
While Israel has a vast amount of human capital, or skilled labor, to employ in 
high-tech industry, the OT currently does not. This means structural differences between 
the two economies do not provide incentives for Israel to invest in the OT. Prior to the 
first intifada, this dynamic worked slightly different because West Bank and Gazan 
workers traversed the border into Israel to work at the lowest end of the wage scale. Their 
earnings constituted about 40 percent of Gaza’s gross national product, and one-quarter 
of the West Bank’s. However, rather than supporting the West Bank and Gaza’s 
economy, tying the value of currency in the OT to Israel’s much stronger shekel 
undermined the potential for domestic manufacturing and production development that a 
weaker currency would allow. Restricted access to land and water rights in the territories 
also limited the potential for economic growth. Palestinian wages, paid in shekels, were 
used to buy Israeli goods, which afforded Israel both the benefit of cheap labor and a 
market for goods. Before the intifada, Israeli exports to the territories totaled $500 
million per year.103 After Oslo, Palestinian migration to and from Israel became more 
restricted, but Israeli-owned labor-intensive manufacturing, like textiles, did not relocate 
to the territories—and it is easy to see why. The Paris Protocol ensured Palestine would 
fall under the same tax and import regime as Israel, while Oslo II granted Palestine less 
than one-fifth of their claim to water. These changes served to widen the gap between 
Israel and the territories and make foreign investment less attractive, particularly for 
businessman already integrated into the more powerful Israeli economy.  
The rule is the Palestinians must impose the same tariffs on imports as the 
Israelis. These tariffs have evolved to protect and promote the Israeli 
economy and so are not consistent with the interests of a fledgling 
economy with limited productive capacity. The Palestinians got a promise 
for smoother access to the Israeli market. But for now, quotas are imposed 
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on Palestinian poultry, eggs, potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes, and melons 
entering the Israeli market.104  
Because the gap in demand for unskilled vs. skilled workers is widening, even if 
the state were to step in for private industry and pursue a plan to reintegrate Palestinian 
labor into the Israeli economy or Israeli business into the OT economy, the standard of 
living for laymen Palestinian employees would at best reflect the disparity evident 
between the Haredi vs. the engineer in Israel. The first intifada doubtlessly had roots in 
the Palestinian experience of economic inequality while working in Israel.  
A March 2013 report by the World Bank concluded that the best means of 
regional integration for a future Palestine is to build an innovative economy like Israel’s. 
“A skilled labor force is one of the key factors that any potential foreign investor would 
consider in deciding whether to invest in the Palestinian Territories even after a political 
solution has been realized.”105 Researchers like Tremaine Tucker, writing in The ICT 
Sector in Palestine: Current State and Potentials, have tried to advocate and develop a 
plan to move the OT to an innovative economy. As of 2011, 46.5 percent of Gazans and 
53.2 percent of West Bankers had a PC at home.106 Under direction from the U.S. State 
Department, Cisco, Google, HP and Intel have collaborated with private Palestinian firms 
to bolster ICT sector growth; however, according to Tucker, Palestinian firms do not 
benefit from government support as Israeli firms do. 
Fragmented, disconnected and often inert, many Palestinian firms struggle 
to establish themselves in the local context, let alone in a regional or 
international one. Without vested financial and institutional interest of the 
government, as seen in cases in most other emerging economies (see 
Singapore, Jordan, Estonia etc.) the ICT sector is left leaderless at a time 
at which it most needs direction and propulsion.107  
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Neither the IPI nor the API directly addresses the issue of how Palestine is to 
improve its economy, whether fully autonomous from Israel or not. Apart from foreign 
funding, Palestine’s primary source of income is trade with Israel, a condition that, 
although imposed by Israel, nevertheless indicates certain geographic constraints on 
specific industries. Agriculture, for example, particularly in Gaza, requires some border 
cooperation with Israel. Even if the Arab states and Israel came to an agreement that 
benefitted each party—even one that led to the political recognition of Palestine as a 
state—without any direct representation, Palestine would likely be left out in the cold 
economically.. Oslo demonstrated this point. In the mid-90s, Israel decreased dependence 
on Palestinian labor within its state borders. Twenty years on, the Palestinian economy is 
in shambles and the two peoples, on a personal level, have become more estranged.108  
A. MILITARY/DEFENSE R&D COMPLEX 
In a country with limited size, space, and few natural resources, defense R&D has 
been instrumental in Israel’s economic globalization. By developing technology and 
skilled labor via the sponsorship of defense-focused education and training, Israel has 
been able to compete internationally by adding a high degree of value above raw 
materials to exports. In economic terms, the pursuit of security has not merely been the 
means of Israel’s survival; it has driven Israel to thrive. 
The cornerstones of Israel’s modern innovation-driven economy are the 1985 Law 
for the Encouragement of Industrial Research and Development and the 1948 IDF 
foundation of the Science Corps. The aim of this law was to foster the country’s already 
vast technological and scientific resource-base by sponsoring science and technology 
research that would benefit export industry, simultaneously developing a highly skilled 
labor force.109 Facilitated, in part, by close albeit informal ties between the political and 
scientific elite, defense policy has included investment in academic and military research, 
as well as public education. Nuclear research plants, established in the 1960s, have 
enriched Israel’s university system for decades. Israel’s institutions of higher education 
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(Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, Weizmann Institute of Science in 
Rehovot, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, along with the universities of Haifa, Beer 
Sheba, Tel Aviv, and Ramat Gan) have established the world’s highest per capita ratio of 
engineers: 135 to every 10,000 citizens.110 In terms of percentage of GDP, Israel also had 
the highest national expenditure on R&D any country in the OECD, making Israel a 
world leader in high technology.111  Figure 1 illustrates national expenditure on research 
and development, 2010.  
 
Figure 1.  National expenditure on civilian R&D, as a percentage of GDP  
among OECD countries, is highest in Israel, 2011. 112 
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Israel’s economy has not only benefitted from a workforce educated in 
increasingly advancing scientific and technical fields, but also from new technologies 
initially intended for military purposes and accessible to private companies. Israel’s first 
computer was assembled and used at the Weizmann Institute, a public institution, in the 
early fifties.113 Telecommunication also began in the government, as the state-owned 
company Bezeq in 1984, which rapidly moved to satellite and fiber-optic technology, 
amplifying Israel’s high-tech capability. Israel’s first high-tech exports through private 
firms were in defense industries that employed advanced technologies initially developed 
by the IDF, including the Israel Aircraft Industries, Rafael, and other defense contractors.  
Although the Arab–Israeli conflict has stunted Israel’s economy in many ways, in 
other respects the conflict is integral to Israel’s economic success. By a large margin, 
Israel dominates arms exports in the MENA region, although Israel is only third in 
proportionate GDP defense spending, after Oman at 10.7 percent and Saudi Arabia at 9.3 
percent.114 At 19 percent regionally, or sixth place worldwide, Israel is also the second-
largest regional recipient of conventional weapons (after the UAE, whose consumption 
was 29.6 percent regionally) and third place worldwide between 1999 and 2003.115 
Although the United States took the lion’s share of the MENA arms market, Israel 
claimed 1.6 percent, a huge global percentage for such a small country. Between 2004 
and 2008, Israel was the eleventh-largest arms exporter worldwide, a 23-percent volume 
increase from 1999–2008, with primary clients in India (24 percent), Turkey (19 percent), 
the U.S. (9 percent), and Mexico (9 percent). Although Israel is reliant on the United 
States for some weapons systems, Israel is the world leader in some defense technologies 
like the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).116 Full transparency on weapons exports, 
however, is nonexistent; SIPRI reported in 2009 that “no state in the Middle East 
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publishes an annual report on its exports of conventional weapons.”117 However, it is 
Israel’s relationship with the United States, the world’s biggest producer, rather than 
Israel’s individual weapons manufacturing, that is the most significant element in Israel’s 
economy. The top 100 arms producing companies in the world (excluding China) in 2004 
and 2005 are shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),  
top 100 arms-producing companies (excluding China) 2005, 2006.  
Israel’s four companies took 1.3 percent of the arms market.118 
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The proportion of GDP expenditure on defense products in Israel is also high in 
global terms, although not the biggest regionally. In 1950, Israel spent 8.5 percent of 
GDP on defense; in 1975, spending increased to 30 percent. It was a mere 6.3 percent in 
2010 and rose to 14.3 percent in 2011. The high level of arms imports, by both Israel and 
Egypt, is partly subsidized by U.S. aid.119 Israeli defense spending can either be seen as a 
hindrance or an asset to her economy. Rivlin writes, “If defense is viewed as an 
expenditure that results from the pressures of the military-industrial complex or because 
of mistaken political policies, then it may be regarded as a burden.”120 By contrast, when 
defense is critical to the viability of civilian institutions, it becomes worth any expense. 
The true value, Rivlin argues, lies between these two extremes. However, an accurate 
description of whether defense spending pays off requires a more complex analysis than 
charting a dot between two variables. Subsidization from abroad and the fostering of 
market relationships that might facilitate Israeli arms sales are also factors worth 
considering in a spending cost-benefit analysis—whether referring to Israel’s spending on 
imports, exports, or investments in research.  
The Lavi fighter project of the mid-1980s illustrates the symbiotic intersection 
between defense spending, Israel’s economy, and international politics. Interested in the 
Lavi fighter, the United States gave Israel funding in U.S. currency. These dollars were 
sold by the Israeli government to domestic companies in exchange for work on the Lavi, 
further reducing the cost of production. However, in 1987, U.S. political and financial 
pressure cancelled the project. Despite a short-term financial loss in projected military 
export revenues, the project produced long-term benefits to Israel’s economy in the form 
of human capital investment. Hundreds of engineers, enriched with experience and 
training from the Lavi project, returned to the job market and formed “one of the 
backbones of the civilian high-technology sector.”121  Rivlin writes, “On the beneficial 
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side, the military has trained thousands of young people in high technology and has 
stimulated production in that sector.”122 
While defense was initially conducted in the public sector, since the 1960s, R&D 
has shifted toward private institutions. Nineteen seventy-six saw the establishment of the 
Industrial Research and Development (BIRD) foundation, a bi-national partnership with 
the United States with a $110 million endowment for the purpose of encouraging 
cooperation between Israeli and U.S. private product development. By 2011, BIRD had 
approved 845 projects and supplied $295 million in grants and investments yielding sales 
of $4.5 billion.123 Israel and the United States’ common interest in defense R&D has 
strategically strengthened political and financial ties between the countries, and Israel’s 
access to the largest and most sophisticated economy in the world, including the elite 
U.S. defense-technology market, has paid enormous dividends.  
Defense spending is the backbone of Israel’s GDP growth and successful 
globalization. Not only has defense spending shaped Israel’s innovative economy through 
R&D technology and human-capital development, it has forged international economic 
alliances with strong countries like the United States to meet high international demand 
for weapons and other defense-inspired high technologies.  
Not merely a commodity, military spending and production accrues additional 
revenues outside of the free market in the form of foreign aid, and because conflict rent-
seeking generates surplus revenue, it does not tax existing production capabilities. This 
dynamic is bad news for economic peace. Raul Caruso draws a distinction with regard to 
surplus revenue, or revenue not tied to market competition for resource allocation, in his 
elaboration of Walter Isard’s 1994 factorial definition of peace economics.124 Caruso 
argues that, in reality, conflict and market structure are not independent. Rather, conflict 
is integrated into a market in varying degrees according to the allocation of non-
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productive resources.125 In other words, some economies have more potential to be 
dominated by political elites than others, according to how they are constituted.  
Economics, by definition, implies a limited number of resources, classically 
juxtaposed as guns vs. butter. If a country invests resources (which include labor, 
materials, land, etc.) in making guns, there will be fewer resources to make butter, and 
vice versa. However, Caruso argues that there is not simply a dichotomy in the allocation 
of resources between production and allocation, or guns vs. butter, but there is a third 
category of productive activity which is invulnerable to appropriation by other industries, 
which Caruso terms “ice cream.”126 Examples of ice-cream production include resource 
rents (from gold, copper, diamonds, etc.) which fuel violent conflict in Africa. Thinking 
specifically of sub-Saharan Africa, Caruso argues that because the ice-cream market is 
impervious to conflict, it is imperative that ice cream be an uncontested resource, 
meaning it be managed by distinct and secure private-property laws.127 Caruso’s policy 
advice for the reduction of conflict is to reduce unproductive military spending, reduce 
economic reliance on contested sectors in which property rights are not clearly defined, 
and increase economic reliance on production sectors in which property rights are 
clear.128  
In Caruso’s terms, Israel’s defense spending might be thought of as ice cream, a 
source of rent money via the United States that operates outside the free market and acts 
as a major resource in Israel’s political economy. Nitzan and Bichler, in The Global 
Political Economy of Israel, and Mintz and Ward, in “The Political Economy of Military 
Spending in Israel,” argue through empirical data modeling that “in Israel the military 
budget at the margins is also employed as a political–economic instrument to help 
manage the economy and provide a favorable election climate for incumbants.”129 The 
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contested resources fueling the conflict are, of course, land, water, and natural-resource 
property rights. Like blood diamonds, albeit on a more sophisticated scale, these 
contested resources support state political actors by domestically increasing popular and 
corporate reliance on the state as the arbitor of security and internationally generating 
foreign-aid assistance. Likewise, as Daniel Doran points out, “Arab dictatorships 
exploited the Israeli–Palestinian dispute to legitimize their severe curtailment of civil 
liberties and justify their massive military budgets, which devoured resources that could 
have been better used to promote economic growth.”130  
B. WHAT FREE MARKET? 
“We passed power from the politicians to the market, the ultimate stick, 
the judge of bad behavior.”  
—Jacob Frenkel, Governor of the Bank of Israel, 
1991–2000131  
 
Raul Caruso’s insistence on the need for private property rights and an 
independent private sector to create economic peace is reinforced by the economist Shir 
Hever’s examination of the curious fact that Israel’s occupation of Palestine is currently a 
burden on the state rather than a financial asset. He writes, “The occupation can be 
considered as a phenomenon that has a very strong economic element to it, and yet profit 
alone cannot explain the actions of the many actors perpetuating or resisting the 
occupation.”132 While Israel has not directly profited from the occupation, several Israeli 
economists have pointed out that Israel’s private sector is heavily dependent on political 
ties and therefore beholden to ideology before profit. The absence of a strong, 
independent business community driven by profit explains why free-market capitalism 
does not characterize Israel’s interest in Palestine. 
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Of the 650 companies traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between 1995 and 
2006, 160 companies constituted close to half of the total stock-market capitalization and 
were controlled by 20 major business groups. On average, the largest ten of these 
business groups controlled 30 percent of all market capitalization, one of the largest 
market shares in the Western world.133 Of the 652 companies listed on the Tel Aviv stock 
exchange, in 1999 specifically, 82 of the most powerful, constituting 41 percent of 
market capitalization, were controlled by five private groups.134 Although these groups 
were diversified across different industries, they were particularly dominant in the 
financial sector, claiming affiliation with half of all banks and insurance companies.135 
The largest in terms of consolidation, the Israel Discount Bankholdings (IDB), is 
controlled by the Rencanti and Carasso family along with Goldman Sachs and William 
Davidson. In 1999, IDB was valued at 22 per cent of the entire Tel Aviv stock market, 
nearly $11 billion with holdings in majority and minority stakes in “hundreds of 
companies spanning the entire business spectrum, from banking, through finance, to high 
technology, industry, real estate, retail, services and transportation.”136 The second-
largest group, at 7.4 per cent and $3.5 billion in banking, finance, raw materials, high 
technology, real estate, and transportation holdings, was the family-owned Ofer group, 
owned by the Ofer brothers. The third-largest group, Koor, primarily owned by Goldman 
Sachs, Arison, and the Nechama/Dankner and Bronfman/Kolber families, with a minority 
stake controlled by the Ofers, was valued at close to 6 percent of the market, at $2.8 
billion with assets primarily in high technology, raw materials, and real estate. At fourth 
was the Dankner family’s Dankner Group, valued at 2.6 per cent of the market, $1.2 
billion in partial control of Bank Hapoalim, Koor, Clal (later a subsidiary of the IDB 
empire) high technology, chemicals, energy, and real estate. Ranking fifth in 
shareholdings, at 2.3 percent of the market and $1.1 billion, was Arison Holdings, owned 
by the Arison and Nechama families, whose primary asset was Bank Hapoalim, a major 
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stakeholder in Koor and IDB, as well as a variety of real estate and construction firms.137 
The pervasiveness of cross-holdings and pyramid-style holding concentrations of 
minority and majority shares is clearly evident in these top five groups. 
The Israeli government plays a pivotal role in this high concentration. With 
holdings in an array of market sectors, from banking, telecommunication, military 
production, and energy to infrastructure and transportation, the government’s stake in the 
publicly traded market was valued at 14.8 percent ($7.2 billion), or the second-largest 
market shareholder after IDB. Unlike the top five, however, the government acts as a 
night watchman, feeding publically funded assets into private industry.138 
The remaining 560 companies listed, accounting for 45 percent of overall market 
capitalization in 1999, minus the 92 that include the top five groups and the government 
together, do not fare much better in terms of concentration.139 The next top five account 
for another 7 percent of market share. Overall, 34 ownership groups controlled 77 percent 
of the market, with the much of the remaining share held by large international firms, as 
seen in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.  Capital Consolidation by proportion of holdings on the  
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 1999.140 
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In 2006, a government-appointed committee created measures such as the 
establishment of a specialized economic court to provide legal avenues for minority 
shareholders, changes in audit procedures, caps on bank credit to single borrowers, and 
changes to board voting procedure to strengthen the powers of minority shareholders and 
independent directors.141 But concentration remains high. By 2011, 24 business groups 
still controlled 136 out of 569 listed companies and 23 percent of companies, not 
counting the independent pharmaceutical giant Teva (mainly owned by U.S. investors), 
held 68 percent of market capitalization. 142 
Capital concentration distorts the market allocation of resources.143 Monopolies, 
evident in industries as diverse as bus transportation, cement manufacturing, and cottage-
cheese production, adversely affect building and living costs and job access, particularly 
for low-wage labor, throughout the country. Due to their large proportion of market 
holdings, highly concentrated company groups pose a security risk to the overall 
economy, which means they have political weight to throw around.144  
The oligopolistic structure of the defense industry in Israel is reflected in 
the fact that six major companies dominate the market. The dependence of 
the government on these major concerns for economic growth, revenues, 
jobs, and exports, has made the government sensitive to the economic 
well-being of these companies.145  
These companies can pressure government to maintain regulations that inhibit 
free-market competition, like high taxes and other restrictions on imports and exemption 
from antitrust laws.  
With slim to no market leverage, small-business interests without ties to vast 
capital holdings do not have great sway over government economic policy. But even the 
most powerful monopolist families do not have the most clout in Israeli politics. No 
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group is as influential over economic policy as the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces). The 
IDF’s influence is two-pronged: the military is politically important because it dovetails 
with state nationalism, and the military controls a vast amount of capital, from cultural 
capital to land. Both the revisionist Charles Freilich, in his 2012 book Zion’s Dilemmas: 
How Israel Makes National Security Policy, and the more critical Patrick Tyler in his 
book, Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Military Elite Who Ran the Country—and 
Why They Can’t Make Peace (also 2012), agree on one important point: the IDF runs 
Israeli politics.146 Tyler writes:  
… the army and the intelligence services dominate the national budget, 
define external and internal threats, initiate policies, review their own 
performance, run a large portion of the economy, control vast tracts of 
land and airspace, and exert immense influence over communications and 
news media through censorship.147  
The vast majority of elected officials come from the upper ranks of the military:  
Aside from the lateral entrance afforded by family connections, the 
political class is a circumscribed group–though not so much today as it 
used to be. There is still virtually no way into a party list through business, 
academia, the media, the Foreign Service, or municipal government… 
Most easily of all, a retired military man can slide sideways into politics at 
the upper level, and virtually no other kind of professional can.148  
Rabin, Ezer Weizmann, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon, Ariel Sharon, Rafael Eytan, 
Avigdor Kahalani, and Ehud Barak were all generals. Politicians are not only seen as no-
nonsense by the Israeli public, they are often seen as less partisan because during their 
military careers they were required to be.149 
Military prestige both fuels and benefits from Israel’s most important economic 
actor: its parent organization, the state government. Israel’s early socialist history was 
marked by a high degree of intervention in the economy, and the state still possesses a 
vast array of capital resources, including foreign aid. Not only does the state set policy, it 
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owns or controls 90 percent of the land, including sea ports, and dictates the structure of 
and access to port trade and industrial land development.150 Vast property holdings, 
which limit private capital by restricting a tenant’s ability to mortgage a property, are just 
one aspect of the state’s pervasiveness within the Israeli economy. Daniel Maman notes 
that the Israeli state has a greater degree of direct management in Israel’s economy than 
the typical Western democracy. He writes, “The burden of maintaining a democratic 
society in the face of continuous military conflict and periodic waves of immigration has 
led to an unusual concentration of power in the state.”151 While corporations are driven 
by financial incentives, governments are driven by political incentives, which may 
include, but are not limited to, financial gains. Maman concludes, “This dominance of 
state organizations means that political considerations are extensively involved in 
economic activity.”152 While the state draws political power from the highly esteemed 
military, the military uses state power to solidify its position. The surest way to 
consolidate both the power of the military and the power of the state is to highlight 
external threat.  
Since 1948, Israel had been essentially building a war economy. Government 
subsidy and protectionism for large industry, combined with huge government military 
spending and accompanying inflation-indexed bonds available for corporate investment, 
tightened the link between state and private interests. Since the 60s, both the IDB (Israeli 
Discount Bank) and Koor have looked to military top brass to fill executive positions. 
This connection afforded IDB and Koor special advantages, including the acquisition of 
defense contracts, tax-exempt foreign partners, privileged holdings in the military sector, 
and other perks.153  
The advantages of a war economy did not end when Israel moved away from 
outwardly evident heavy state intervention. The Likud party’s economic platform, from 
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the 1980s until today, has been to espouse free-market rhetoric and the virtue of small 
government while increasing government debt through military-industrial spending. “In 
their imagination, they were merely removing the shackles of government from an 
otherwise competitive economy. What they did in practice, however, was deregulate an 
oligopolistic war economy, effectively inviting dominant capital to take the lead.”154 
Unsurprising, the economic lead taken by conglomerates with not only a corporate 
culture but a financial basis firmly derived from defense has offered little incentive to 
sow seeds of cooperation when, financially and politically, economic cooperation reaps 
comparably meager rewards in undeveloped Palestine.  
C. ECONOMIC POWER DISPARITIES: THE PROBLEM WITH ELITE-
INITIATED PEACE 
The extent of private capital is not only critical for the success of economic peace 
in terms of its proportional relationship to state power, but also in terms of the structure 
of the economic ties that are formed. High market consolidation means the primary 
actors, and consequently, the primary beneficiaries of market integration, are a select few. 
Elite rewards benefit the elite. Yet the majority needs to gain vested interest if economic 
peace is to be successful. 
Galia Press-Barnathan seeks to address the discrepancy in the literature between 
strong findings for a correlation between economic interdependence and peaceful 
relations, and the failure to explain it.155 Press-Barnathan’s argument attempts to 
incorporate the perspective of the two main opposing camps in the economic peace 
theory debate: the liberals, who see the correlation as causal, and the realists, who are 
skeptical that trade can have an impact on high-politics issues and contend that trade 
gains benefit only a small minority.156 When the literature does attempt to explain the 
correlation, the focus tends to be on why interdependence prevents conflict, not whether 
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it can create peace—a subtle but important distinction. To determine whether peace-
building can occur via economic incentive, Press-Barnathan outlines two stages in the 
peace process: Benjamin Miller’s “cold peace,” or the peace treaty itself (Stage I), and 
“normal peace,” when main issues are resolved and transnational ties begin to develop 
(Stage II). 157 Stage I is likely to be state centered and comprised of the most powerful 
domestic economic actors with ties to the government. However, these same well-
connected business leaders are insufficient ushers of Stage II change. Instead, it is the 
broader public—smaller producers and consumers—who will determine whether 
normalization occurs.158 Liberal theory often assumes trade interactions are symmetrical 
or that economic power disparity is not a factor; yet Press-Barnathan sees disparity in 
relatively coercive political power and size-determined economic influence as 
detrimental to mutual cooperation. In other words, as political and economic inequality 
increases, the likelihood of peace, long-term, decreases. Moreover, she sees a problem 
with defining the meaning of “mutual cooperation,” a definition subject to the above 
inequalities. 159 Last, Press-Barnathan argues that while third parties can create incentives 
for a cold peace, they cannot directly affect normalization, although they can help by 
continuously rewarding cooperative activity.160 Figure 4 outlines the trouble with 
maintaining a long-term economic peace agreement once achieved by three different 
means.   
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Figure 4.  Press-Barnathan, Summary of Hypothesis.161. 
What Press-Barnathan fails to address in the Arab–Israeli conflict is its regional 
triadic nature. She frames the conflict as it was in the Oslo Accords, as between Israel 
and Palestine, with the United States presiding as the third party. Instead, the recent Arab 
and Israeli Peace Initiatives are agreements centered on two different primary actors: the 
Arab League and Israel. While her assertion that third-party involvement will not bring 
normalization is borne out by history, the Arab States cannot necessarily be considered a 
third party, since they have played such a key role in the conflict. If a cold peace is 
contingent on broader economic interest, might those interests be strong enough to make 
big compromises attractive? And if a deal is brokered by an equally strong actor, a 
coalition of Arab States, will disparity still exist? While the answers to these questions 
are speculative, factoring them into a treatment of economics in the Arab–Israeli conflict 
is warranted, particularly in light of emerging movements. 
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The Arab Peace Initiative itself is a product of peace, or so David Bearce’s 
argument would suggest.162 Citing the fact that empirical evidence shows commercial 
peace reduces the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict but the literature does little 
to explain how, Bearce argues that the GCC was formed by the economically beneficial 
relationship that interstate trade fostered, which brought state leaders together regularly, 
built trust, and incentivized peaceful bargaining and interstate security coordination.163 In 
support of this thesis, the principal architect of the Arab Peace Initiative, Prince Abdullah 
of Saudi Arabia, used the incentive of economic integration as the proposal’s big prize. It 
would seem in practice that the GCC values economic incentive. But for them, the stakes 
are not high. If they can broker a successful peace deal, they will become the toast of the 
Middle East; if they can broker a broken peace deal, it will not be they who suffer; and if 
they broker no deal at all, they at least can claim the moral high-ground because they 
tried. For Israel, it is another matter. 
While groups like the Israeli Peace Initiative are eager to extoll the virtues of 
economic peace (and there seem to be many), economic peace remains something of a 
mystery. International political economy is a marvelously complex organism and 
economic peace a multi-faceted and, ultimately, subjective phenomenon. Patrick 
McDonald writes:  
The debate over whether and how international commerce alters the 
foreign policy of states, and in particular the decision of war, has gained 
renewed prominence in the fields of international security and 
international political economy. Despite substantial empirical support for 
the proposition that increasing levels of cross-border economic flows–
defined either in terms of trade or capital movements–decrease the 
probability of conflict, scholars have yet to approach a consensus 
concerning the precise nature of this link.164  
However, there are some definite conclusions that can be drawn about the context 
in which economic peace flourishes. McDonald explains that the specifics of the trade 
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interaction are critical to establishing economic peace theory; economic peace can only 
be built on a foundation of free trade. When protectionism defines the economic 
relationship, trade can actually lead to conflict. His conclusions, based on empirical 
analysis, are fundamental to defining Israel’s trade relationships. “As the domestic 
influence of protectionism grows, the capacity of consumers and exporters to lobby the 
state and produce a peaceful foreign policy declines.”165 Small, powerful groups are in a 
unique position to demand protectionism. Without broad-based integration that cannot 
benefit from political pandering, incentive will remain allied to, and even enforce, a 
political structure hostile to open competition, as Press-Barnathan conclusions seem to 
suggest.  
This is the singular, most challenging aspect, of the case for economic peace in 
the Arab–Israeli conflict. The structure of the Israeli economy is in no way conducive to 
broad-based integration; elites on all sides hold monopolies in the political economy; 
huge power disparities exist; and a third party cannot alter these imbalances.  
Though the discussion of peace economics usually ends there, evidence that a 
decline in the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis has occurred as contact 
diminishes has only received anecdotal attention.  Neve Gordon writes about a story he 
told his Israeli students in 2006 about his own experience of learning to drive in Palestine 
in 1981, a year before he and all other Jewish settlers were required to move as part of the 
peace agreement with Egypt. 
I described to my students how my friends from the farming communities 
located in the Sinai and the small town of Yamit took their lessons in the 
Palestinian town of Rafah and were among the first to pass their driving 
tests. My students found this story incomprehensible. They simply could 
not imagine Israeli teenagers taking driving lessons in the middle of 
Rafah, which, in their minds, is no more than a terrorist nest riddled with 
tunnels used to smuggle weapons from Egypt—weapons that are 
subsequently used against Israeli targets. The average age difference 
between me and my students is only 15 years but our perspectives are 
radically different. Most of my students have never talked with 
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories, except perhaps as soldiers 
during their military service. Their acquaintance with Palestinians is 
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consequently limited to three-minute news bytes that almost always report 
on Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets or Israeli military assaults on 
Palestinian towns. When I was a high-school student, by contrast, I 
frequently hitched a ride back from school with Palestinian taxis on their 
way from Gaza to Beer-Sheva. Within the current context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, this act is unfathomable.166 
Neither economic integration nor prosperity is a panacea. However, as a goal, 
both prosperity and integration can shift the context of the relationship between the two 
peoples. History has shown us the process in reverse, yet very little scholarship has tried 
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IV.  NEGLECTED OR JANUS-FACED: THE MISSING 
ECONOMIC PEACE 
The overall attitude of the government toward the industrialization of the 
Arab sector and the development of Arab-owned enterprises has been that 
these are, first and foremost political rather than economic problems. 
“Given the political sensitivity of these issues, one official of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry told me, “no man in government will say what 
they really think [concerning them].” 
—Ian Lustick167 
Hostility is not an eternal factor. Even today, when the situation looks 
hopeless, we have to remember that nations hostile to each other for tens 




In 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia along with the Arab League and 
prominent Arab businessmen crafted an initiative known as the Arab Peace Initiative, or 
Saudi Initiative, which has been re-ratified every year by the Arab League for eleven 
years.169 This initiative comes at a relevant time. Gawdat Bahgat writes in “The Arab 
Peace Initiative: An Assessment,” the failure of the United States to find a solution to the 
Arab–Israeli conflict has converged with two recent events to make the Arab states not 
only more amenable to Israeli “normalization” than ever before, but interested in taking 
the lead on a new peace deal.170  
Unprecedented wealth in the GCC states has created both huge incentive and the 
financial means to maintain stability. From 1999 to 2007, barrel prices jumped from 
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$17.97 to $72.39, grossing an estimated 1.8 trillion in revenue for GCC countries in 
2007.  
The Saudis also recognize a growing threat to their prosperity.171 The wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which targeted Iran’s two greatest enemies, the Taliban and Saddam 
Hussein, have inadvertently strengthened the Islamic Republic’s national security. In 
addition to Sunni–Shiite religious differences, Arab states are concerned by Tehran’s 
nuclear ambitions and have taken an engagement, as opposed to a confrontational, tack. 
“We are a neighbor to Iran in the Gulf, which is a small area, so we are keen for harmony 
and peace among countries in the region. We have relations with Iran and we talk with 
them and, if we feel any danger, we have relations that allow us to talk about it,” said the 
Saudi foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal.172 A peace agreement with Israel would 
undermine the ability of Iranian Shiite as well as local Sunni radicals to “exploit the issue 
in the Arab street.”173 Israel has sought to highlight this common interest. At the 2008 
Doha Forum for Democracy, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni stated, “The Middle East’s 
biggest challenge is the fight between moderates and extremists. And we, the moderates, 
are all part of the same camp, threatened by extremist forces in the region.”174 Put more 
bluntly, Shimon Perez echoed, “One reason for Israel to make peace with the Palestinians 
is to show the Sunnis of the Middle East that they need not be dominated by Iran and 
submit to a fanatical Shiite minority.”175 Economic and political conditions appear, from 
an optimist’s perspective, ripe for cooperation.  
However, from Israeli leadership’s position, the situation is less rosy. What 
guarantees are there that the Gulf would grant full “normalization?” And what guarantee 
is there, in the turbulence of the Arab Spring, that Arab League proposals will be 
respected by future governments in Egypt and Syria? To be convinced that economic 
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benefits will be forthcoming, Israeli leadership will likely require trade agreements to be 
drawn up. Israeli negotiators know that, if history is any guide, details are essential.  
There are others who would simply like to get talks going. In March of 2011, a 
private Israeli group comprising businessmen, former IDF officials, and academics, 
drafted the Israeli Peace Initiative (IPI) as a response to the Saudi Initiative. The IPI 
proposes, along with a two-state solution on 1997 lines, economic development as the 
third rung of their four-step peace framework.176 According to IPI, regime change in the 
Arab world and Israel’s robust economy and grip on security present a unique 
opportunity for Israel to take the initiative in forming a new relationship through peace 
talks. Echoing the World Bank, they view economics as crucial, because economic 
prosperity is linked to security and stabilization. From academics to key Zionist 
politicians, there is widespread consensus that poverty, unemployment, and a sense of 
bitterness are the perfect storm for unrest. IPI’s September 2011 memo states: 
The central theme of the IPI Group–that the status quo is dangerous and 
that Israel must take the initiative and present a regional proposal–is fast 
becoming more and more relevant. Even Israel’s intelligence 
organizations recently said that only a political initiative and effective 
negotiations will calm the region. At the same time, there are indications 
that our concerns about the economic implications are justified.177  
It is not difficult to see why economic peace has both practical and theoretical 
appeal for both Israelis and Arabs who anticipate economic gains for their countries. IKV 
Pax Christi, an independent research organization, finds that nearly every quantitative 
study found a negative correlation between conflict and economic interdependence, 
leading some liberalist scholars to suggest that capitalism, not democracy, is at the root of 
peace.178 Since the post-1967 era of General Moshe Dayan’s liberal social and economic 
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policies, Arab–Israeli relations have worsened on the street, despite democratic 
representation in both Israel and the occupied territories.179  
However, despite the advantages of cooperation, Israel’s nationalist-centered 
politics and economic structure are geared toward the perpetuation of conflict: not with 
Arab States, but with the proximal occupied territories. Although opening markets in 
Arab states and gaining their support is a coveted prize for Israel; the dynamics of Israel’s 
political and economic systems are particularly unsuited to making the compromises 
necessary to lay the foundations of the API or the IPI.  
Yitzhak Rabin believed the only way to avoid violence and bring all parties to the 
negotiating table was for Israel to achieve a position of regional dominance.180 Ironically, 
Israel’s strength, its economic strength in particular, is now the greatest obstacle to the 
course of economic peace. The fact that Israel’s economy has not appeared to suffer as a 
result of the conflict means that the very foundation for economic peace—economic 
incentive—is absent. Certainly economic integration into the Middle East would boost 
Israeli trade, but entrenched sectors of Israel’s economy that depend on military funding 
will potentially suffer. Shir Hever writes,  
Although peace negotiations with the Palestinians have come to a 
standstill, and Israel’s military opponents (mainly Hamas, Iran, and 
Hezbollah) have proved they can pose a significant and ever-increasing 
challenge to Israel’s regional military dominance, the Israeli economy 
seems to be prospering. Economists have therefore changed their tune, 
arguing that security and political issues are unrelated to economic issues, 
and that sound “free market” economic policies can generate sustained 
growth even in the middle of a state of conflict.181 
This conclusion suggests that, in fact, Israel’s R&D investments are unaffected, 
and even thrive, under continued conflict. Raoul Caruso writes that in order for economic 
peace to be successful, a country must pursue: “policies to reduce unproductive spending 
as military expenditures, policies to reduce the reliance of economies on contested 
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sectors, and policies to favor the allocation of resources to uncontested production in 
productive sectors.”182 For economic peace to succeed, Israel must alter the military’s 
role in its economy and discontinue supporting “contested” sectors of its economy, for 
example, the funding of settlements on the West Bank. 
Despite the fact that there is nothing “free” about the Palestinian market and very 
little in the Israeli market that is unsheltered by state protectionism, Prime Minister 
Netanyahu continues to employ the discourse of economic peace and “free trade” in an 
entirely rhetorical fashion, while manipulating the Palestinian economy by tightening and 
loosening sanctions and checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza to send political 
messages.183 In response to protest, like the West Bank boycotts of products made in 
illegal settlements and opposition to Israel’s entrance into the OECD, Prime Minister 
Netanyahu sidestepped legitimate concerns, as well as the fact they were peacefully 
expressed, by officially stating, “Israel is aiming for peace and economic prosperity. The 
Palestinians must decide if they are aiming for peace or not.” 184  
The real choice for Palestinians in the OT currently seems to be between 
accepting hegemony and resorting to some degree of “terrorism.” The West Bank and 
Gaza have as little political power as they do economic, a reason scholars like Raja 
Khalidi and Sobhi Samour have dismissed economic peace altogether. They argue a 
neoliberal approach: 
cannot succeed either as the midwife of independence or as a strategy for 
Palestinian economic development. Its weaknesses… derive not only from 
neoliberalism’s inability to deliver sustainable and equitable economic 
growth worldwide, but also because neoliberal “governance” under 
occupation, however “good,” cannot substitute for the broader struggle for 
national rights nor ensure the Palestinian right to development.185 
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While Israel’s economy continues to grow, the occupation is steamrolling the 
Palestinian economy, eliminating state autonomy along with political sovereignty. In 
2008 and 2009, the separation wall, still under construction, decreased West Bank trade 
(90 percent of which is exported to Israel in any case) by 30 percent.186 In 2012, security 
checks at crossing points, which are often inadequately staffed and have limited working 
hours, numbered over 500.187 Queues for these checkpoints can begin at 4 a.m., and 
trucks are only allowed one delivery per day and can contain only one type of product. 
These procedures are especially hard on Palestinian farmers, who rely on rapid transport 
to maintain the quality of their products. The frequent denial of entry for West Bankers 
into East Jerusalem, the heart of the West Bank economy, has also had a markedly 
negative effect.188  President Netanyahu’s calls for “economic peace” sidesteps key 
details, like the fact that the 25,000 Palestinians employed by the hotly contested 
settlements do not exemplify economic cooperation; rather, like Israel’s imposed trade 
imbalance, they constitute economic hegemony. In 2009, Israel exported $15 billion 
worth of goods to Palestine, while Palestinian exports to Israel, by far its primary export 
and import locality, totaled a mere $1.5 billion.189 For Palestine, policy implemented in 
the name of economic peace has amounted to economic occupation. Contradictions 
between Israel’s official position and official policy have an extensive history.  
These many contradictions include, among other things, the construction 
of illegal settlements in areas from which Israel intended to withdraw, the 
annexation of areas without the concomitant bestowal of citizenship on the 
annexed population, investing effort to improve the standard of living of 
occupied Palestinians to make them more docile, followed by the launch 
of brutal attacks which destroy the infrastructure necessary for the survival 
of the Palestinian population…welcoming of international aid…while at 
the same time [erecting] obstacles to aid.190 
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Based on this poor track record, Palestinian leadership rejects economic, 
neoliberal solutions in favor of renewed political approaches.191 Despite the fact that 
neither politics nor neoliberalism will singlehandedly bring peace, the debate is polarized 
between economics and politics, while a comprehensive bilateral approach is overlooked. 
Khalidi and Samour’s protest that neoliberalism will not alleviate root Palestinian 
grievances fits with the criteria for economic peace, which should never be confused with 
unqualified economic integration or economic improvement. This point must be taken 
into consideration by the Israeli and Arab initiatives and by Secretary Kerry in his current 
economic peace plan in order to ensure success, but a redress of inequality appears to be 
absent from all three plans Koby Huberman, key architect of the IPI, concedes that 
broader regional cooperative peace will have nothing to do with economic cooperation 
with the Palestinian “man on the street.” “We do not deal with managing the daily life of 
the Palestinians. We deal with a regional arrangement which includes a detailed analysis 
of the need to advance a regional economy.”192 But the advancement of a regional 
economy is not comprehensive enough to be called economic peace. 
Economic peace describes unmediated, continual interaction. According to Press-
Barnathan, economic peace only prevents conflict when integration touches every level of 
the social hierarchy on both sides193. McDonald argues that agreements built around 
protectionism can actually incite conflict, a significant obstacle in a region where the 
state is the most important economic actor.194 Lack of equal footing in either the political 
or economic sphere between Israel and Palestine mean that trade free from protectionism 
is currently unattainable—but free trade is pivotal in the success of economic peace. 
“Until Palestinians can negotiate from a position of strength, all such agreements, which 
are forged under the illusion of normal relations between Palestinians and Israelis, 
glossing over the inequalities inherent in dispossession and occupation, could create long-
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lasting damage to the Palestinian economy.”195 In other words, without balanced power, 
any new peace agreement will fail as badly as the Oslo Accords. 
In addition to the structural obstacles between Israel and compromise with the 
Arab League, are two important calculations: the fundamentalist–nationalist political 
power of the settlements and the government’s mandate to provide security. The 
awkward fact remains that, despite the potential economic rewards of normalization, 
withdrawing support for settlements is as difficult as convincing the Israeli people that 
there could be an end to Palestinian violence. When Israelis are asked whether they 
would support a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders if Palestinian violence ceased, 
51 percent agree.196 Another 21 percent oppose, but only because they do not believe 
Palestinian violence will cease.197 When asked, “In light of the severe security situation, 
there are two possible extreme solutions: transfer of the residents of the territories, or 
withdrawal to the 1967 lines and settlement evacuation. Which would you choose?” 
Twenty-nine percent support transfer, 35 percent support withdrawal, and 29 percent 
believe neither serves Israel’s interests, according to two different polls conducted by the 
Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University in 2002.198 It is 
evident from the wide range of responses that polls about settlements, and peace in 
general, are difficult to take because the questions are hypothetical. However, it is easy to 
understand why the government successfully supports the settlements: why would Israelis 
forfeit the rights of their own people for the sake of an impossible dream? In this respect, 
the security debate meets the settler debate—and for this reason, the security calculation 
must be turned on its head before economic incentive has a chance.   
A. ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE OSLO ACCORDS 
The great events of history are often due to secular changes in the growth 
of population and other fundamental economic causes, which, escaping by 
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their gradual character the notice of contemporary observers, are attributed 
to the follies of statesman or the fanaticism of atheists.  
—John Maynard Keynes199 
In many ways, the API and IPI are a continuation of the Madrid Peace Talks, 
which were derailed by the Oslo Agreements in the mid-nineties. For the last twenty 
years, the Arab states have been largely silent and the conflict has focused on Israeli–
Palestinian relations. Economic cooperation has generally been conceived of by 
politicians, bankers, and businessmen as highly localized. The World Bank’s 2005 
project, for example, relied on border transit routes between Israel and Gaza without 
taking into account Israel’s larger problem of incentive. Economic growth in Gaza simply 
does not benefit Israel’s economic or political interests. However, Israel would profit 
tremendously, both politically and economically, from cooperation with the larger Arab 
world; if allowing Gaza border access to Egypt, sea ports, and the West Bank were the 
price of Arab cooperation, Israel might be willing to pay it. Political leaders alone are 
incapable of forging such an alliance, although they are a necessary part of its ratification, 
because such an agreement requires the organic participation of independent business 
interests.  
While the success of economic cooperation may depend on specific, limited 
factors, the argument that cooperation is impossible in a protracted conflict has no 
empirical basis. Very little research has so far explored how economic integration not 
only correlates with peace or maintains peace, but how it can build peace. So far, the 
extensive scholarly literature on the Arab–Israeli conflict has almost nothing to say about 
how economic integration might ameliorate relationships. Instead, attention is paid to the 
importance of state power, discounting the role of capital on its structuring and 
maintenance. The very few analyses that have been done, like the commissioned research 
paper by the IKV Pax Christi Group,200 tend to dismiss economic peace for lack of 
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evidence, or because there appear to serious obstacles to its success, without examining 
the relationship economics has to political ideas and to security itself.  
Concerning Netanyahu’s “economic peace” rhetoric, the IKV Pax Christi report 
determined (with little regard for how practical incentive between the two parties might 
be integral to a solution) that overtures toward economic liberalization in the West Bank 
would be ineffective if the conflict were not addressed on a political level first. In some 
respects, this assertion is true: since private enterprise has not built a bridge to peace on 
its own, it seems pressure from outside Israel’s market is a vital ingredient. However, 
reliance on diplomatic solutions, much like the argument for first establishing security, 
has also failed to address problems at the root of the conflict, problems the majority of 
the population face on a daily level: the need for jobs, education, and hope for a future. 
One need look no further for an example of the failure of a top-down political solution 
than the Oslo Accords. According to Edward Said, despite Yitzak Rabin’s assassination, 
the Hebron massacre, and the bellicose Binyamin Netanyahu period from 1996–99, the 
Oslo agreements would have been a wrap were in not for the al Aqsa Intifada in 
September 2000. As Said writes,  
With Ehud Barak’s assumption of power in May 1999 things at first 
speeded up, so much so that a comprehensive peace between Israel, the 
Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon may have seemed possible were it not for 
the Intifada. All the Arab leaders, minus their people, seem to want it.201  
Scholars as disparate in viewpoint as Alan Dershowitz and Noam Chomsky agree 
that the short-lived Taba Negotiations in the wake of al Aqsa were the closest Israel and 
Palestine have ever got to peace, but, again, domestic political interests took precedent.202 
The erroneous assumption in the IKV Pax Christi Report is the idea that that 
economics is not integral to any contexts of conflict amelioration and can be isolated 
from the political elements to a solution. This fundamental misconception fuels the 
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illusion that economic deprivation, imposed by Israel, is merely a peripheral source of the 
contemporary conflict in the minds of ordinary Palestinians.203  
The Oslo Accords never specified how Palestine was to attain autonomy or, if not 
independence from the Israeli economy, economic equality with it. By excluding a plan 
for how the promised free trade and liberalization would practically take shape, Oslo 
ensured the OT’s economic wings would remain clipped. The man on the street was sure 
to see none of the cooperation supposedly guaranteed by the Paris Protocol; rather, he 
was sure to witness the intensification of de-development and economic sabotage at 
Israel’s hand. What Oslo can tell us is that a political solution is not complete without an 
economic one, and further research is needed into the relationship between the two. 
B. ECONOMIC PEACE-BUILDING IN CONTEXT  
The standard model applied in post-conflict reconstruction generally aims to 
establish improvement in three main areas: security, good governance, and economic 
opportunity.204 While the U.S. government has consistently addressed these areas in over 
twenty years of post-conflict reconstruction, a coherent methodology that combines the 
redress of immediate needs with long-term, sustainable development has yet to be 
successfully implemented. In this conflict, long-term economic health is particularly 
difficult to develop because it requires both substantial levels of good governance and 
security to allow equal access to opportunities and resources.205 However, when poverty 
is pervasive, it is very difficult to establish rule of law and security free of corruption and, 
as Johanna Forman asserts, the U.S. has no game plan for solving resource-driven 
conflicts. In countries where control of a natural resource or the share of profits to be 
made from conflict is integral to the political economy, it is difficult or impossible to 
establish a legal regulatory framework strong enough to be impartial.206  
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Though many by default assume the conflict is a completely ideologically driven, 
resource scarcity is another framework by which to understand the Palestinian–Israeli 
enmity. Nigel Roberts writes, “Stripped of its religious and ideological characteristics, the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a struggle about land and the existential security that people 
derive from uncontested possession of a national home.”207 However, the reason this 
conflict can never be stripped down is because ideology feeds off economic scarcity– as 
dispossession increases, so does radicalism. Paul Collier writes:  
In the economist’s view of conflict, grievance will turn out to be neither a 
cause of conflict nor an accidental by-product of it. Rather, a sense of 
grievance is deliberately generated by rebel organizations… [grievance] 
may be based on some objective grounds for complaint, or it may be 
conjured up by massaging prejudices. However, while this distinction is 
morally interesting to observers—is the cause just?—it is of no practical 
importance.208  
Using data from civil wars from 1965–1999, Paul Collier found several 
socioeconomic red flags that prominently feature in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.209 
First, Collier found that if a country has an unusually large diaspora, chances that a 
conflict will reignite is 36 percent, as opposed to countries with a small diaspora, which 
is only 6 percent.210 Diasporas that inhabit conflict-free zones, which are generally more 
prosperous, are able to finance conflict that they themselves are removed from. Diasporas 
can therefore fund homeland conflicts indefinitely, which they often view romantically 
from their distant vantage, with no direct experience of the violence. Moreover, as Collier 
points out, “Diasporas…may continue to nurse grievances as a form of asserting 
continued belonging.” 211 Israel, of course, was founded by and remains dependent on the 
financial support of the Jewish diaspora. The Palestinian displacement has created a 
                                                 
207 Nigel Roberts, “Hard Lessons From Oslo: Foreign Aid and the Mistakes of the 1990s” in Aid, 
Diplomacy, and Facts on the Ground, edited by Anne Le More, Robert Lowe, and Michael Keating, 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2005), 21. 
208 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” Leashing the 
Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, Pamela R. Aall, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 199. 
209 Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” 202. 
210 Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” 202. 
211 Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” 210. 
 77
massive, landless diaspora, thousands of whom have been living in refugee camps for the 
last sixty years. Like the Jewish diaspora, displaced Palestinians raise money from 
outside sources to fund their cause in the homeland, much like the Tamil Tigers of Sri 
Lanka, supported by Muslims in Canada, or the Kosovo Liberation Army, funded by 
Albanians in Europe.  
Secondly, the dispersion and composition of ethnic and religious identity between 
Jews and Arabs in the broader region of Israel–Palestine teeters at the most precarious 
demographic point possible. Collier found that if a region is divided between only a few 
ethnic or religious groups and the dominant group constitutes close to, but less than, a 
controlling share, the risk of conflict doubles, because discrimination against the non-
minority group ensures the consolidation of power within the dominant group.212 By 
contrast, when a country has a vast array of ethnic and religious groups, political–
economic alliances on ethnic–religious lines may function only if coalitions are formed, 
forcing a cooperation that makes for a safer society. In the case of Israel, the 
demographic threat of the Arab population, which surfaces in debates over such topics as  
the right of return for Palestinian refugees, threatens Jewish dominance in Israel. 
These conditions are, according to Jackson-Preece, all the more precarious in the 
model of the nation-state.213 As she puts it, “ethnic cleansing has been used as an 
instrument of nation-state creation for as long as homogeneous nation-states have been 
the ideal form of political organization.” Where there is “a people” there is always an 
“other,” and as long as the nation-state exists as the ideal political model, so will ethnic 
cleansing.214 This dynamic can also provoke maximal aggression in the minority 
population. Collier writes, “In societies characterized by ethnic dominance, the minority 
has little to hope for from the political process. Thus it is possible that rebellion in 
societies with ethnic dominance is the behavior of despair.”215 Collier also found that the 
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more ethnically and religiously homogeneous a country, the more unsafe—risk of 
conflict increases by 23 percent above a broadly heterogeneous country.216 The 
persistence of ethnic (Arab vs. Jewish) and religious (Muslim vs. Judaic) as the dominant 
criteria upon which territory and political rights are based has made a democratic solution 
problematic, if not impossible. The magnitude of identity politics in the Arab–Israeli 
conflict is less about the specifics of these fundamental religious and ethnic differences 
than about the fear of domination by an allied and equally matched group, in terms of 
strength and population.  
To manage ethnic conflict, there are essentially two solutions, apart from 
genocide and apartheid: change the political structure of the nation-state or change the 
territorial borders. In his analysis of consociational democracies, Lijphart provides a map 
for how states can politically achieve compromise across ethnic lines while maintaining 
autonomous political authority within their community.217 This is achieved through four 
principles: each ethnic group has its own political leader; each has mutual veto; each is 
represented proportionally, based on population size, in the military, civil affairs, etc.; 
and each has the authority to make community-based laws. This model encourages 
cooperation and mitigates conflict through political representation.218 Critics of 
consociationalism argue that its structure creates incentive for elites to entrench ethnic 
divisions (as opposed to class or gender differences) as the ultimately defining basis for 
political choice; but this is not a threat in this conflict, because it is already so undeniably 
the case.219 However, there is no evidence that the Israeli majority is willing or interested 
in creating a secular, non-Jewish state or a co-dominant Arab–Jewish state, ruling out a 
consociational single-state solution. Apart from apartheid, genocide, and forcible 
deportation, the one state cannot function as a democracy unless Israelis are willing to 
give up Jewish dominance. 
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When a political solution is nonviable, secession is a potential management 
solution, particularly when an ethnicity is located in a distinct geographical region.220 
O’Leary distinguishes the relationship between partition and secession as a question of 
agency: there is a huge difference between a partition that simply aids in a planned, 
mutually-agreed-upon secession and a partition that functions as a “fresh cut” executed 
by the dominant political power across a shared homeland.221 O’Leary argues that a true 
partition, a fresh cut made by the ruling class, has always caused more violence during 
and after its creation, and should only be used in cases where it can be demonstrated to 
mitigate genocide.222 Fresh cuts like the 1947 externally imposed division between India 
and Pakistan took hundreds of thousands of lives.223 As an alternative, Brendan O’Leary 
and Jerry Muller suggest regional distinctions be drawn, as in Kuwait.224 Whether 
territorially or politically, tolerating heterogeneity, rather than weeding it out, 
paradoxically results in better chances for long-term cohesion. Israel’s construction of the 
wall increases tensions, and, ludicrously, Israel’s simultaneous construction of West 
Bank settlements undermines the potential for a territorially cohesive secession. Where, 
then, is the political solution?  
Unrest, in Palestine specifically, can also be seen as a symptom of rapid 
population growth with economic decline. Collier found that every percentage point in 
the rate of population growth raises the risk of conflict by approximately 2.5 percentage 
points.225 The risk of conflict also increases one percentage point for every percentage 
point that per-capita income is reduced.226 In a study of conflict in Africa, a strong 
correlation was found between wealth and civil war by using rainfall as a control; when 
rainfall was above average, so was economic growth, and civil war was less likely; when 
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rainfall was sparse, growth fell and conflict broke out.227 By linking the source of slow 
economic growth to rainfall rather than the effects of conflict itself, Edward Miguel, 
Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti were able to show that economic malaise could 
be a direct cause of conflict rather than merely its result.228 
C. OSLO: EVIDENCE FOR THE CO-DEPENDENCE OF POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS IN SECURING PEACE 
What became known as the Oslo Accords began with secret talks, initiated by 
Israel’s deputy foreign minister, Yossi Beilin, between two Israeli academics (Yair 
Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak) and three close associates of Yasser Arafat ( Ahmed Qurei, 
Hassan Asfour, and Maher al-Kurd).229 These talks were headed by FAFO, a major 
European peace-research institute in Oslo, Norway.230 The talks began informally in the 
summer of 1992 as a back channel to the stalemated official talks, moderated by the U.S., 
at the Madrid Peace Conference of October 1991.231The 1989 collapse of the Soviet 
Union meant less support for Arab secular nationalism from a number of Arab political 
players, including the PLO, and therefore more incentive for concessions to be made.232 
It also meant the landscape had changed. Uri Savir, who was later directly involved in the 
talks, recalls one of this issues discussed at the time.  
Religious fundamentalism, which thrives on poverty, was now a serious 
threat to most of the regimes in the region—especially in the case of Iran, 
which was exporting terror and developing nonconventional weapons. As 
a result, economic development had become more important to those Arab 
governments than traditional strategic considerations. The United States 
was being courted by almost every country in the area, and a 
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demonstration of stability was the only way to attract serious economic 
investment and American political involvement.233  
Consequently, many Arabs were beginning to view Israel as a potential economic 
partner. The intifada had thus far brought neither political nor economic progress. The 
PLO, exiled and diplomatically isolated in Tunisia after Yasser Arafat’s fateful literal and 
figurative embrace of Saddam Hussein—and on the verge of bankruptcy—was now 
threatened by the intifada “homegrown” leadership.234  
In his first Oslo meeting, Uri Savir writes that one of the first topics of discussion 
was economics. He quotes PLO negotiator Ahmed Qurei as saying,  
We want to cooperate with you toward developing the region; encouraging 
the creation of a Marshall Plan for the Middle East; developing our 
economies, so that we can open the doors to the Arab world for you and to 
freedom for ourselves. The situation in the occupied territories is 
desperate, politically and economically. Time is running out.235  
Economic arrangements, primarily outlined in the Paris Protocol, became a key 
topic of the accords. 
The Madrid Conference, meanwhile, was facing several roadblocks. Under the 
leadership of Hafez al-Assad, Syria, Israel’s most staunch Arab opponent demanded  the 
Golan Heights, which, by now had 12,000 Israeli settlers. This became a single-issue 
sticking point that threatened to stall further negotiation.236 The talks were further stalled 
by the November 1992 U.S. election, which saw the retirement of the Bush–Baker 
team237. As Uri Savir writes,  
The ideologically and politically rigid Syrians were moving very slowly if 
at all. The Jordanians had signaled that until a breakthrough had occurred 
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with the Palestinians, they too would continue to wait. And so the 
Palestinians, the weakest link in the chain, were the key to peace.238  
Hafez al-Assad, a notoriously tough negotiator, was more firm and demanding 
than the beleaguered PLO, and Israel saw an opportunity. 
The gist of the ensuing Oslo agreements was that the Israeli Civil Administration 
would gradually relinquish control over Gaza and the West Bank to the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), the PLO’s civil administration, until a more permanent law-and-order 
body and peace arrangement was established. The international community would act as 
an essential third party, the mediator and arbiter of disputes, the compliance enforcer for 
both sides, and the financier.239 This plan was intended to build trust between the two 
peoples by demonstrating cooperation between Israel and her longstanding bitter enemy, 
the PLO. The PLO, along with its Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), was to become, 
essentially, Israel’s guardian. This bold idea was based on the underlying assumption that 
a more long-term solution would soon be found.  
In return for the PA’s acceptance of a policing role, the PA was given two critical 
prerogatives, a risky diplomatic move.240 The first of these was the integration into the 
Palestinian financial system of certain “opaque elements that could operate beneath any 
“radar screen” of public accountability” that would allow President Arafat “what was 
referred to by some diplomats as ‘walkabout money.’”241 These included, in the context 
of the 1994 Paris Protocol on Economic Relations, the establishment of monopsonistic 
supply arrangements that exported key commodities, most notably, petroleum products 
and cement from Israeli suppliers exclusively to an account controlled, not by the PA 
treasury, but by President Arafat alone.  
The second was wide discretionary leeway on human-rights obligations by PA 
governance. President Arafat argued this was a necessary measure to counter the deep-
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seated resentment toward Israel on the street. These two features of the agreement created 
the impression for many Palestinians that the PA was corrupt, uncaring, and ineffective.242 
Meanwhile, the core of the conflict, the relationship between security, 
sovereignty, and land, remained untouched. The furthest the Oslo Accords went in 
addressing the ongoing issue of settlements was to state under Article IV of the 
declaration of principles, “The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza as a single 
territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved in the interim 
period.”243 Israeli settlement in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, 
involves the seizure of Palestinian land, enforced by the Israeli military. Between 1993 
and 2000, a time when both sides were ostensibly serious about building trust, the 
number of Israeli settlers in the occupied territories increased from approximately 
240,000 to 373,000, leading many Palestinians to conclude that Oslo was a ploy by Israel 
to derail the first intifada and strengthen Israel’s grip on the West Bank.244 
In 2002, following the second intifada, President Bush introduced the “roadmap,” 
endorsed by both the PA and Israel.245 However, lack of political will to enforce the 
frustratingly vague agreements remains the plaguing issue. Israel continues to build 
settlements and Palestinians continue to have slim recourse. Israel controls the West 
Bank and Gazan economies primarily through control of all entry/exit points in 
Palestinian areas and more than 700 makeshift checkpoints within the country—limiting 
international commercial access—and through the two-color license-plate travel system, 
in which Palestinians are issued a license plate that prohibits access to certain 
highways.246 The situation today looks very much like what Thomas Freidman predicted 
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in 1989: “The Israelis will remain on top, the Palestinians will make sure that they never 
enjoy it, and everything else will just be commentary.”247  
The question is, why? If Israel is primarily to blame, or at least not helping, as a 
plethora of notable scholars, independent researchers, and journalists have concluded, 
what is Israel’s motivation?  
Israel proclaims its priority is security, above all else, because the state has a 
mandate to protect its citizens—all of whom are potential victims of suicide attacks. 
Israel’s “security first” predates both intifadas, but justifies Israel’s tight control over 
movement in the occupied territories, strangling economic growth, midnight raids, and 
peaceful demonstration. The Jerusalem Media Centre & Communication Centre stated in 
1994:  
“Security” reasons have provided the Israeli authorities with a convenient 
excuse to refuse anything from planting tomatoes to not publishing a 
budget for the occupied territories in 25 years. Discriminatory practices 
abound, from prohibiting picking wild thyme to restrictions on setting up a 
business, export to Europe and registering every single tractor.248  
As Michael Keating points out:  
It is not at all clear whether these measures will increase Israel’s security. 
How can the presence of millions of disenfranchised, impoverished, angry, 
and traumatized Palestinians living in squalid conditions in a small, 
crowded geographical area and restricted in their movements ever be a 
basis for Israeli security?249  
Israel’s stranglehold over the Palestinian economy, its most pervasive sphere of 
control, suggests that Israel fears that Palestinian economic development will evolve into 
economic independence, leading to political independence.250 This was in fact the PLO’s 
ostensible objective and the reason they placed so much emphasis on economic growth in 
the Oslo negotiations.251 However, in the final settlement, the PLO leadership was more 
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concerned with retaining power than with the long-term economic welfare of the state, as 
the final PLO settlement attests. While arrangements for Yasser Arafat’s personal finance 
were extensive and detailed, Oslo contained no specifics about the implementation of 
long-term economic recovery in the territories. 
During the first intifada, Palestinians had taken actions to foster an independent 
economy, such as the establishment of “Intifada farms” that raised produce, livestock, 
and dairy; boycotts of Israeli products; and refusal to pay taxes.252 These peaceful 
protests were supported, although not directly affiliated, with violent militarized protest 
by Hamas, a group that drew ranks from the prison system. It is unsurprising that Hamas, 
which stems from religious radicalism rather than from the PLO’s secular nationalism, 
was formed in the most squalid region of the OT: the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. 
While 10 percent of the West Bank population lived in refugee camps, 25 percent, or 
over 180,000 Gazans, were living in camps. Half of these Gazan refugees lived in squalid 
conditions, with no running water and open sewage in the streets.253 During the 1980s, 
over half of the male workforce in Gaza and one third of the workforce in the West Bank 
were employed in Israel, which virtually eliminated unemployment in the territories.254 
However, this did not indicate improved relations. In their daily trek across the border, 
Gazans and West Bankers saw the vast disparity between their living conditions and 
those of the Israelis. In Israel, they were subjected to humiliating strip-searches and 
discrimination. The younger generation in particular became acutely aware that, despite 
their ability to speak Hebrew and the merits of their labor, they received lower wages 
than their Israeli coworkers, were ineligible for tenure, and could not expect an 
occupation much better than menial labor.255 Aryeh Shalev of the Jaffee Center for 
Strategic Studies writes, “Studies show that political violence does not necessarily arise 
from a situation of relative or even absolute poverty, but is generated by the emergence or 
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formation of a gap between expectations and reality due to changes in one or both of 
these variables.”256 
In an effort to curb growing Hamas recruitment, Israel exiled prisoners to 
southern Lebanon, which only brought more attention to the group and let to more Hamas 
focus on the West Bank.257 As failure of the PLO to produce any substantive results 
became increasingly apparent to ordinary Palestinians, support for Hamas, which 
provided basic welfare services, began to increase. In terms of political power, Israel and 
the PLO had a common enemy. For the PLO, political power appears to have trumped 
economic gains: concessions were granted for Arafat’s personal finance, while substance 
in the structuring of an independent Palestinian economy was left dangling.  
The road map to peace, as developed through Oslo 1 (1993) and Oslo 2 
(1995) presupposes that Israel and Palestine are interested in reaping the 
gains from trade implicit in a negotiated settlement (Cowen, 2004a, b: 
Dershowits, 2005). This historical evidence of the past 60 years 
unequivocally indicates that neither side is seriously interested in such an 
outcome (Plaut, 2004a, b; Farsoun 1997).258 
As the Palestinian people became disillusioned by the apparent corruption within 
the PA, support for Hamas began to increase and in January of 2006, Hamas won a 
majority in the PA’s general elections. Infighting between the PLO and Hamas continues. 
As Ziad Abu Amr described the struggle, “If you have two brothers, put them into a cage, 
and deprive them of basic essential needs for life, they will fight.”259  
Palestinian fragmentation has allowed Israel to dominate the territory more freely; 
however, in the long run, it threatens to disintegrate the PA and Israel’s precious Oslo 
mandate. 
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The assumption that the Israeli government’s strategy is to undermine the 
Palestinian economy offers a rational explanation for Israel’s course of action over the 
last fifty-odd years, including Israel’s ambivalence toward the PLO and the PA, which 
Israel seems to simultaneously recognize and undermine. Anne Le More cites Peter 
Weinberge’s 2002 dissertation from the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, which postulates that “fragmentation may be seen as a strategy to force the 
Palestinian leadership to forgo its demands for a state and settle for an alternative, sub-
sovereign final status agreement.”260 President Bush’s 2004 speech, which effectively 
recognized Israeli settlement blocks in the West Bank and dismissed the right of return 
for Palestinian refugees, seems to confirm that, if this is the strategy, it is working.  
The imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians has benefitted Israel 
in both economic and territorial terms. As Jimmy Weinblatt writes in, “Future Economic 
Arrangements between Israel and the Palestinians: an Israeli Perspective,” these 
imbalances emerged in the Oslo agreements. Oslo began paying Israel dividends in 1993. 
Unemployment fell significantly and government funding of social services increased as 
foreign investment began flowing into the economy. Although the PA did make 
economic gains, progress happened at a much slower pace. The Paris Protocol favored 
short-term economic gain that benefitted Israel rather than Palestine. Not only was it an 
interim agreement that hinged upon the long-term resolution of the Oslo process, the 
Protocol contained very few specifics on the implementation of Palestinian economic 
growth or what Palestine’s final economic state should be. Consequentially, there was 
neither a political nor economic contingency plan for how Palestine’s economy should be 
run once Israel’s occupation ended. While Weinblatt also concedes that there was a fatal 
imbalance of power between the two sides, he also contends, like the Pax Christi report, 
that the solution must be initially solved politically by addressing a list of economic 
problems before the formation of economic incentive is broached by either party.261 
However, the mechanism for this political change is unclear. He writes,  
                                                 
260 Le More, Aid, Diplomacy, and Facts on the Ground, 29. 
261 Jimmy Weinblatt, “Future Economic Arrangements Between Israel and the Palestinians: an Israeli 
Perspective, Aid, Diplomacy, and Facts on the Ground, The Case of Palestine, edited by Anne Le More, 
Robert Lowe and Michael Keating. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2005, 109.    
 88
The gap that exists between the two economies is much too great. Such a 
difference is extremely unhealthy for relations between the people and for 
future ties at the national level. A future agreement will have to be 
designated to generate an income convergence mechanism between the 
two nations. This goal calls for rapid growth of the Palestinian 
economy.262  
However, this is a bit of a catch-22: it would seem that politics is needed to lift 
occupation and restriction of the OT economy, yet without some economic incentive on 
Israel’s side, there is no political pressure to enforce such a concession. Israel had already 
begun reaping the economic benefits of the Oslo treaty before control of the territories 
was relinquished. Incentive was therefore structured in favor of signing the treaty and 
maintaining occupation, since Israel would, rationally, not make any unaccounted-for 
concessions.   
While it is apparent that “An independent Palestinian state cannot be considered 
successful unless its people have good economic opportunities and quality of life. … An 
independent Palestinian state will need to improve economic conditions for its people just 
as urgently as it will need to improve security conditions,” 263 it is equally apparent that 
there is no political incentive to relinquish control of the occupied economy. Nor has 
economic incentive alone been powerful enough to alter the political will. Although 
evidence indicates that the improvement of living conditions and the availability of jobs 
for Palestinians will improve civil relations between the two groups, Israel’s continued 
acquisition of territory through settlements, combined with a natural discomfort with the 
idea of an independent Palestine that could potentially demand more, has charted a course 
toward continued conflict.  
Oslo’s failure attests that a lasting settlement will require consensus between 
groups with balanced power. Second, the terms of economic rehabilitation and power-
sharing need to be explicitly stated and enforced by a third party or the incentive to 
adhere to the agreement must be attached to some incentive. In other words, there should 
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either be a stick or a carrot, or both, to ensure the agreement is respected by both sides. If 
the IPI/API reaches a consensus, there might be political and economic incentive for 
Israel and the Arab states to ensure Palestinian sovereignty. However, as a decision in 
which only political elites are represented, it is unclear that the Arab States will be able to 
co-opt Palestine’s fractured political base, much less justly represent, the Palestinian’s 
political and economic cause. 
While Oslo superficially appeared to address the security, governance, and 
economic pillars of post-conflict reconstruction, critical specifics, like clear political 
borders, that would end the competition between the precarious demographic proportions 
highlighted in conflict literature, were left unattended. Instead, as Oslo breaks down, 
Israel has settled for the worst possible strategy: the building of a physical partition. If it 
was not before, the OT is now the perfect incubator for hostility. As its constrained 
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V. A NEW MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY: WHY ECONOMIC 
PEACE WARRANTS FURTHER STUDY 
You can’t build peace by military means. Peace must be built on a system 
of trust. As someone who knows the Palestinians well, I claim that there 
should be no problem building a system of trust with them, a genuine one. 
—Avi Dichter, former director of Shin Bet (2000) and Minister of 
Internal Security (2006–9) 264 
When Israelis talk about this idea—understanding the equality of Arab and 
Jew—they say, ‘We have to talk to them at the height of the eyes.’ In 
other words, at eye level—with neither party having to look up or down at 
the other. The problem is, there are few Israelis who use that phrase—they 
are the exception.  
—Richard Ben Cramer. 265 
 
Since the British Mandate period, economic peace has been no more than a 
showpiece in Israel’s diplomatic repertoire, periodically dusted off and recentered on the 
negotiating table as if it were a novel concept. Despite widespread support for a return to 
talks, according to a 2012 Gallup poll of Jewish Israelis, non-Jewish Israelis, and 
Palestinians, negotiations based on economic peace remain unappealing to Israel’s 
political elite, because it would mean acquiescing to President Abbas’s demand that 
Israel forfeit rights to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank and total control of 
Jerusalem—an indication that the conflict is still very much rooted in nationalism. Prime 
Minister Netanyahu adamantly refuses those demands, and Israel’s current position of 
strength allows him to.266 “Out of the 22 members of Israel’s cabinet, only Yaakov Peri, 
the science minister and former head of the internal security service, Shin Bet, said Israel 
should take the Arab League’s proposal seriously.”267 Even Secretary of State John Kerry  
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is pushing Israel to “look hard” at the proposal, the issue of settlements, the sticking point 
in the last round of negotiations only two years ago, remains politically taboo. The very 
week of Kerry’s visit, Israel approved the construction of more than 700 new settlement 
homes.268 
Considering Israel’s ethnocentric nationalism—evident in statements like Israeli 
economic and trade minister Naftali Bennett’s incendiary pronouncement on June 2013 
about the West Bank and Gaza, “This is our home. We are the tenants here, not 
occupiers. The story of establishing a Palestinian state within our country, that story is 
over”269—and considering the obstacles to creating cross-markets between Israel and 
Palestine that might influence politics, as well as the gross imbalance of economic and 
political power between the two parties, the prospect of economic cooperation leading to 
a better relationship, much less a lasting agreement, is grim.  
However, before it is cast aside, economic peace should be considered more 
carefully. Economic peace is about creating a specific context—a context of cooperation, 
trust, mutual dependence, equality, and dignity. In other words, economic peace is the 
shaping of a political economy that favors peace. In his analysis of the 19th century 
European history, Mark R. Brawley makes the point that the nature of a state’s political 
economy can set the stage for conflict, a dynamic that in some ways descriptive of Israel 
today. He writes:  
The economic conflicts within Germany itself also had repercussions. The 
instability of the German regime is often cited as a reason for German’s 
role in the initiation of World War I. The regime was built on a coalition 
of politically conservative groups—the Junkers and heavy industry—yet 
the distributional impact of trade continually threatened to push these two 
groups apart. To keep them together, and to keep the working class and 
liberals apart, policies were packaged in a ways that created problematic 
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 The conservative could agree on nationalistic programs, so these became 
the centerpieces of foreign policy, which then enveloped foreign economic 
policy.270 
What would a political economy that supported peace in Israel, Gaza, and the 
West Bank look like? Some conclusions can be drawn from the failures of the current 
system. 
A. THE PROBLEM OF LEVERAGE 
In 2005, the World Bank held a London Conference on a “Joint Palestinian– 
Israeli Private Sector Declaration Presented at the Conference: Promoting Economic 
Growth in the West Bank and Gaza through the Private Sector.” The first line of the 
preamble reads:  
The Palestinian and Israeli private sectors have accepted the invitation of 
Her Majesty’s Treasury and the World Bank to develop a Declaration 
which sets out the steps required for promoting Palestinian economic 
growth and their expectations from the Palestinian Authority, Government 
of Israel, and the international community. 271 
It continues: 
 
There are valuable business and investment opportunities for Palestinian, 
Israeli and international investors. The points included in this Declaration 
are aimed at promoting business activity throughout the West Bank and 
Gaza by: Reducing physical impediments and ensuring that measures to 
increase reliability and efficiency of movement of goods and people are 
defined and implemented; Identifying measures to be put in place to 
protect the activities of investors and their businesses; Reducing the legal 
and regulatory obstacles to investment facing both domestic and 
international investors.272 
Yet, realistically, by what leverage will business pull the strings of either 
Palestine or Israel’s political economy? Both economies are essentially run by the Israeli 
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state.273 However, from the political angle of the masses rather than the elites, Yossi 
Alpher argues that those in the Israeli middle- and upper class who have benefited from 
neo-liberalism will be particularly sensitive about international boycotts of Israeli goods, 
which could damage Israel’s cost efficiency and competitiveness. He writes, “[Prime 
Minister Ariel] Sharon’s very decision to begin to remove settlements and withdraw from 
territories can be seen in this context as his own acknowledgement that Israel must take 
steps to neutralize international pressures.”274 The current Israeli administration, 
however, is far less realistic about settlements. Sharon also perceived that demographic 
trends coupled with the desire for a “Jewish state” were steering Israel toward a South 
Africa-like Apartheid within a few decades.275 
If trade cooperation is the economic carrot, boycotts are the economic stick. 
However, assuming strong political will existed, the likelihood that Westerners 
themselves could afford to boycott Israel’s $7–7.4 billion per annum technology-
intensive services is unlikely.276 It seems the recent European Union boycott of the 
settlements is, unfortunately, too paltry to make the current government serious enough 
about upcoming talks to cease settlements.277  
In the 1980s, Israel followed a policy of selective economic integration with 
Palestine that deliberately undermined Palestinian economic independence. The 1990s 
were characterized by neglect and occupation, with 54 percent of Palestinian territory 
under Israeli military and settler control.278 The opposite of peace-building economic 
integration, such policy amounts to economic manipulation and only enflames relations. 
An economic peace plan cannot ignore the lesson of Israel’s own economic success: only 
the public sector is willing to make the long-term investment in education and research 
and development that will lay the foundation of human capital that contemporary 
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globalization requires. Otherwise, private, international investment will exploit the 
existing labor and consumer base rather than build it—and will rightly be seen by many 
as a new strategy for Palestine’s colonization. Economics will bring peace to the 
Palestinian people only when it brings them dignity and agency, essentially, when 
economics becomes a vehicle for the balance of power between the two peoples, 
effectively doing what Israel resists most. 
Glenn E. Robinson argues that peace based on grossly imbalanced power, (e.g., 
the fragile peace made by The Treaty of Versailles) is far more precarious for both parties 
than a peace built on equal power (e.g., mutually assured destruction in the Cold War).279 
Unlike the cold peace ensured by the relative equality in power of Egypt and Israel’s 
1979 treaty, the Oslo Accords’ hegemonic peace has not only entrenched divisions 
between Palestinians and Israelis, but fragmented Israel’s internal political culture.280 
Greater equality of economic power between the two states must begin at a 
domestic level. Even if Israel forged a new compromise with the Arab states, the business 
interests that would make it possible have little interest in investing in the structure of the 
Palestinian state, including the education, public research, and other social welfare 
necessary for sustained economic development in Palestine that could potentially match 
Israel’s. If Palestine’s development improves solely in terms of GBP, not only are 
peaceful relations unlikely, but the conflict could worsen. There are cases in which the 
closing of the income gap between two groups did not deter the course of the less 
privileged’s discontent.281 Walker Connor writes:  
It is good to remind ourselves of the first rule of human behavior: it is not 
what is but what people perceive as is that has behavioral consequences. 
And viewed through an ethnic prism, a disadvantageous economic 
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imbalance is very apt to be seen as the product of discrimination. But this 
suggests that it is ethnicity that can impregnate economic data with the 
power to incite rather than vice versa. In situations where no ethno-
national division is present, regionally defined groups will accept 
unfavorable economic disparities between themselves and others in the 
state which, had they coincided with ethno-national groups, would bring 
charges of discrimination and rumblings of political separatism.282 
Certainly, GDP growth cannot be not an end in itself. GDP, in fact, empirically 
signifies very little in terms of peace. Economic incentive does not function as a 
destination, but exclusively as a means to an end. Financial incentive to cooperate builds 
peace by creating common ground where both parties must put identity differences aside 
and construct functional relationships in order to attain a mutually beneficial reward. 
Therefore, economic peace can only function when it is based on a specific type of 
economic structure. GDP-generating business partnerships that are run by elites do not 
build relationships, because they take the form of a superstructure that can function 
without direct interaction with the majority of employees. A Coca-Cola factory can be 
owned by a single Israeli who never meets the vast majority of his Palestinian employees. 
For economic peace to work, economic incentives work like a matrix of incentivized 
interaction. In contrast to a superstructure model, an IT company that employs both 
Israelis and Palestinians is an environment in which groups mingle together as equals 
working together for a common purpose. This simple, yet profound, difference 
determines whether economic cooperation erodes identity politics and supports peaceful 
relations or merges it with class differences, making the chasm between the two peoples 
only more profound. 
What Secretary of State Kerry and Prime Minister Netanyahu are calling 
economic peace is nothing more than the potential widening of foreign investment 
markets. Without addressing the “man on the street’s” need for basic dignity, a mal-
formed “economic peace” will be the harbinger of even more hostile and entrenched 
Arab and Jewish nationalism and the potential advocacy, by those like Naftali Bennett, of 
an apartheid state that will destroy what is left of the liberal nature of Israeli society. 
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Palestinian autonomy is just as important to Israel’s integrity as Palestine’s. Yet the 2013 
Kerry peace plan does not deal with that issue. Even if new economic arrangements bring 
foreign investment by companies like Coco-Cola and a soaring GDP to Palestine, as 
promised, as long as Netanyahu insists on maintaining Israel’s control of Area C land, an 
exclusive claim to the natural gas fields off the coast of Gaza, the opening of a 
Palestinian national airport, the cessation of Jewish settlements on the West Bank, and 
the continuance of negotiation over the actual border of Palestine, peace will remain 
elusive.283  
Roy Wagner, a member of the Israeli activist group Anarchists Against the Wall, 
makes this very point in his lamentation to GlobalPost.com.  
The premise that we have to have elite politicians solving problems for us 
economically—while a group of people, based on their ethnicity, are 
marked as terrorists, while they are losing mobility, livelihood, rights—is 
wrong. It is an impossible situation to resolve this way. The rights should 
be respected. The occupation should first be ended, and full equality 
should be given to everyone.284  
As economic peace analysis has shown, economic integration from the top down 
is not an effective method for moderating relations; worse, it can inflame them.  
Kerry’s efforts are all the more quixotic because they have been made so many 
times before. Israel’s leaders have parroted economic-peace policy for the better part of a 
century, blithely ignoring the fundamental contradictions in Israel’s national goals and 
identity. Prime Minister Netanyahu proudly claims the Secretary of State’s economic 
peace approach is one he has advocated for years.285 In 2008, he stated, “We must weave 
an economic peace alongside a political process. That means that we have to strengthen 
the moderate parts of the Palestinian economy by handing rapid growth in those areas, 
rapid economic growth that gives a stake for peace for ordinary Palestinians.”286 Yet 
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even as Secretary Kerry made his fifth trip to the Holy Land in June of 2013, Israel, 
despite condemnation from the UN Secretary General and at exorbitant cost, plans to go 
ahead with the construction of 1,000 new settlement homes in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem.287 At least Kerry’s visits may have prompted Israel to resume payments to the 
Palestinian Authority of taxes totaling $115 million that had been frozen following 
Palestine’s successful bid for nonmember-state status in the UN general assembly.288 The 
prime minister fails the address the contradiction that if Israel’s goal is to reinforce the 
politics of moderate, ordinary citizens, Israel must first weave an economic peace 
alongside its own political process, beginning with an end to settlements. Between 1994, 
the year the Paris Protocol was signed, and 2001, the settler population rose from 122,700 
to 198,000.289 Moreover, Netanyahu’s statement ignores the blaring conclusion made by 
a number of notable scholars and independent peace organizations, that the problem with 
Palestine’s economy is Israel’s occupation.290 
B. ECONOMICS AND THE CASUS BELLI 
We wanted security and got more terrorism. They wanted a state and got 
more settlements. When we started the Oslo process in 1993–94, 100,000 
settlers lived in the West Bank and Gaza, not including the new Jerusalem 
suburbs. At the end of the process, 6–7 years later, in the summer of 200 
when the peace process collapsed, there were over 220,000 settlers. Ehud 
Barak is very proud to have built more settlements than Bibi Netanyahu or 
any other prime minister before him….It was obvious we were heading to 
another intifada, another round of violence by a group, a society, a nation 
that felt it had nothing to lose.291  
—former director of Shin Bet 
Despite the damage economic hardship wreaks on political relationships, for 
Israel to take the initiative in alleviating economic pressure there remains a political 
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problem: it would require that Israel give up power over the land. But, for Palestinians, 
the occupations and settlements are not just political issues, they are economic issues. 
According to Daniel Levy, although the official land occupied by settlements is about one 
percent, 42.8 percent of the West Bank is under the control of municipal and regional 
councils, zoning, and planning and they constrict the Palestinian movement and access to 
land resources, threating the economic and political viability of a two-state solution.292 
Economic erosion has impacted Palestinian politics. Rapid decline in the Palestinian 
standard of living has undermined the Palestinian governing body, already weakened by 
reorganization after Oslo.293 
Israel’s support of settlements belies Israel’s insincerity toward pursuing an 
economic peace plan, just as it did a century ago, since it renders Palestinian autonomy 
impotent. And, like a century ago, Israel relies on external funding to stretch political 
boundaries. William Seighart claims:  
Settlement-building is continuing apace, not just with existing settlements, 
but with the establishment of new outposts every year in the West Bank, 
and despite international criticism, even from Israel’s closest ally, the 
United States, the process continues, often funded by donations by the 
United States supported by tax breaks for U.S. citizens who make these 
kinds of donations. So, given the rate of settlement development, it’s hard 
to find any international political figure who genuinely believes in the 
Israeli government’s intent to seek peace with the Palestinians based on 
the 1967 borders, maybe with some land swaps, with a capital in East 
Jerusalem. And rhetoric of the current Israeli political campaign, 
combined with (these) maps, tells a story. And I think you’d have to be a 
peculiarly credulous individual to believe a different story.294 
However, it is easy to criticize any nation from outside. Israel faces a serious 
internal political quandary: the mere prospect of economic peace requires Israel to give 
up the dream, shared by many, of a state united by a sacred geography. Moreover, from a 
realist position, the argument that Palestinian autonomy is a threat to Israel is compelling. 
Underlying Israel’s calculation that relinquishing power would be a mistake is the fear 
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that while economic disparity underpins tensions, at least in part, Palestinian capital is a 
potential threat to Israel’s security. Economically constricting policy may hurt moderate 
Palestinians, but it also hampers Hamas’ ability to buy rockets. Perhaps the most 
fundamental dilemma for Israel about economic cooperation is that preventing future 
radicalization might mean putting money in the hands of the already radicalized. This 
idea is not likely to garner much political support, particularly when there is no strong, 
external political force pressuring Israel to take the plunge—yet no better strategy has yet 
been proffered.  
In either a single state or two-state solution, Israel must eventually give 
Palestinians rights, including economic rights. However, Israel, by default, continues to 
limit its strategy to the short-term neutralization of both violence and Palestinian political 
power while neglecting long-term economic rehabilitation, thereby compounding 
Palestinian nationalist and fundamentalist fervor. If Palestinians lose hope, both peoples 
will suffer. But political factors have created an impasse.  
While the promise of Palestinian economic rights has been an important plank in 
establishing security and Israeli hegemony in the West Bank, fulfilling those promises 
opens the door on an unknown. However, as time ticks on with no evidence that things 
will change, the more frightening does the prospect of relinquishing control become for 
Israel. A former head of Shin Bet reminisces, in The Gatekeepers: 
We prevented more attacks every year. We achieved greater security every 
year. How did it happen? It had a lot to do with changes we made in the 
Shin Bet, but the truth must be told. The most significant achievement was 
coordination between us and the Palestinians. I met with all the top 
Palestinian security officials, all of them, once a month, to coordinate 
intelligence. They always told me, “We’re not your agents. We don’t put 
Hamas member in prison for your sake. We only do it because our people 
believe that, at the end of the day, we’ll have a state beside Israel. When 
we no longer believe that, forget about us.295 
There is no better evidence for the ability of Israelis and Palestinians to cooperate 
than the Palestinian Authority.296 However, if the PA does not achieve evident measures 
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of equality for the Palestinian people, it will implode. Whether economic peace will 
effectively ease tensions is a question of whether attitudes on either side will shift with 
the facility they did in the most redeeming aspect of Oslo—the cooperation between 
Israeli security forces and the PA. Since Oslo, however, the PA has been unable to pursue 
the expansion of exports, lowering of imports, job creation, and industrial and 
agricultural production, due to its lack of regulatory and institutional authority.297 The 
continued use in each new agreement of vague language that defers to the existing power 
disparity between Israel and Palestine has continued to undermine the PA and worsen the 
situation. UNCTAD’s Raja Khalidi and Shar Taghdisi-Rad summarize: 
In 2009, as the envisioned viable and vibrant Palestinian state is again on 
the international agenda, concerned economic policymakers can benefit 
from a candid assessment of how prolonged occupation – and the 
economic strategies associated with it – have been an obstacle to such a 
solution. In whatever form a new offer of Israeli economic liberalization 
towards the Palestinian economy might come, as long as it is not 
underpinned by the establishment of sovereign Palestinian economic 
institutions and adequate national economic policy space, its impact will 
ultimately prolong and deepen occupation.298 
Economics plays a role in the cause of the conflict and must play a role in its cure. 
History shows that Jews and Arabs can live together. However, it will require redefining 
the terms of the relationship to be based on equality and dignity. Economics can and must 
play a role in this relationship, and, unlike in Oslo, it must be an explicit part of a 
political solution. As Daniel Levi eloquently puts it: 
Are the Palestinians uniquely intolerant? Uniquely impossible to make 
peace with? Are we uniquely destined to be enemies forever? I’d argue 
that view is ahistorical, is a misreading of reality and its more than a little 
bit prejudiced. Unique, permanent unreasonableness does not apply to 
Palestinians or Muslims, it does not apply to Jews or Israelis. If we 
remove the casus belli, the burning humiliation of today and tomorrow 
will everything still be dictated by the humiliations of yesterday? Both 
peoples can be forward-looking.299 
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C. ECONOMIC PEACE AS COSMOPOLITANISM 
I started as a coordinator in the Nablus district, very pretty area, full of 
olive trees. I liked to get out of my car and wander in the field, refugee 
camps, alleyways, visit homes, sit in cafes, talk. I really loved the 
interaction with the people. From that exotic encounter with olive trees, 
landscapes, and peasants, I found myself at the center of the Palestinian 
problem. I was working in the refugee camps…suddenly you see what 
refugees are…Once you look more deeply you say, ‘wait, I’m not an 
observer here to take photos and leave. I’m an active participant.’ At first 
your security role is all you care about. It’s easier to be on that side.  
—Former Director of Shin Bet300 
There is something to the fact that ordinary interaction can bring about 
remarkable change. The “contact hypothesis” continues to be actively explored by a 
number of scholars in an array of protracted conflicts. Echoing the findings for economic 
peace, the contact hypothesis is contingent on a specific structure.  
Gordon Allport’s (1954) seminal work on the possibility of reducing 
prejudice and bias via intergroup contact (i.e., the “contact hypothesis”) 
suggests four necessary conditions for contact to be effective: equal status 
during the contact phase, a common goal, the need for intergroup 
cooperation in achieving the goal, and the sanction or support of authority 
figures.301  
Deepak Malhotra and Sumanasirei Liyanage found evidence that peace 
workshops with Palestinians and Israelis, under Allport’s conditions, had lasting 
effects.302  
Economic cooperation’s potential to lead to peace lies with its role in establishing 
common ground and equality. But, before Israelis and Palestinians can “talk to each other 
at the height of their eyes,” Palestinians need to have economic freedom in terms of the 
law and economic institutions that support a middle class. Economic peace is a question 
of socioeconomics, not gross output. A job is not merely a means to procure material 
well-being, but plays a fundamental role in something more intangible: political and 
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social representation. Fordism was not important because of material benefits alone, but 
because the middle-class wage Henry Ford paid his employees gave them the ability to 
purchase the products they sold, gave them a sense of dignity, and established a middle 
class in America.  
A job may be a source of representation and employment can be a means of 
empowerment or exploitation. Palestinians, for example, working as ditch diggers in 
West Bank Jewish artifact digs (that later become sites for settlements) are not benefitting 
from economic cooperation. As Jurgen Habermas writes in “The Concept of Human 
Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights: 
Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human 
dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, 
their moral source. In spite of its abstract meaning, ‘human dignity’ still 
retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of 
depending on the social recognition of a status….303  
While Habermas is particularly concerned with democracy as political 
representation, the structural power of capital has had a critical role in shaping political 
systems, democratic representation in particular, demonstrating how economic and 
political representation are inexorably linked.  
The tie between social and economic representation explains why, based on 
empirical data analysis, economic peace is ineffective when it only creates economic 
integration among social elites. In such cases, status is merely consolidated among a few, 
leaving the general population with even less political leverage. In the broader context of 
the Middle East, Palestine’s lack of political status is proportional to its lack of material 
wealth. 
But, just as history demonstrates the immutability of the current conflict’s 
conditions, it also can tell us there was a time when economic cooperation prevailed in 
the Holy Land. In 1967, Shlomo Goitein published an exhaustive three-volume account 
of what is known as the Cairo Geniza: a vast collection of letters, primarily from middle-
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class Jews from the tenth to thirteenth centuries, including court records, contracts, and 
other accounts that were, according to the common belief that any manuscript which on 
which the name of God appeared should be buried like the human body, entombed in a 
lumber room only to be unearthed centuries later and preserved in ancient libraries 
around the world. His first volume, on the subject of economics, paints a picture of a 
society that, despite some tensions, is colorful and cosmopolitan: 
In the Islamic guilds of the later Middle Ages, just as their Christian 
counterparts in Europe, had a semireligious character…No such 
exclusiveness is to be observed in the Geniza papers. We hear of Muslim 
and Jewish silversmiths and glassworkers who run ships in partnership, 
each group taking off its own weekly holiday; of Muslim carpenters 
working partly as employees and partly as partners of a Jewish fellow 
carpenter, and even of a Jewish court inviting Gentile experts in purple-
dyeing together with their Jewish colleagues to estimate the value of the 
equipment of a workshop forming part of the inheritance of an orphan 
girl…the manufacture and the sale of goods were as little separated in this 
period as they were in ancient Rome.304 
Sami Zubaida calls for a return, in terms of persons, places, milieus, and 
ideologies, to cosmopolitanism throughout the Middle East: 
What we mean by “cosmopolitan,” then, is not the fact of multi-cultural 
co-existence, but the development of ways of living and thinking, styles, 
of life which are deracinated from communities and cultures of origin, 
from conventional living, from family and home-centeredness and have 
developed into a culturally promiscuous life drawing on diverse ideas, 
traditions, and innovations.305 
The goal of an economic solution should be to create conditions for 
cosmopolitanism, and, I can think of no better platform than economics to create “the 
weakening of communal boundaries, the creation of institutions, milieus, and means of 
communication outside communal and religious authority, in which individuals from 
diverse backgrounds and cultures can participate;” the pre-requisite social environment 
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for cosmopolitanism that Zubaida describes.306 Many who support the Israeli Peace 
Initiative agree. Naava Mashiah, CEO of M.E. Links, Senior Consultant at ISHRA and 
editor of MEDABIZ economic news writes,  
Knowing that the other side is not a monolithic society but is rather 
comprised of many different groups with competing values and priorities, 
including large segments of society who actually want to live in peace 
with each other, could begin to shape a Middle East which is a healthier 
neighborhood for all its inhabitants.307 
The economic-peace solution warrants far greater research than the limited 
introduction presented here. However, I hope to have made one point: that economic 
peace must be supported through a matrix, not only by a hierarchy. For the primary 
obstacles to economic peace are, in sum, elite based: ethno-nationalism and economic 
differences derived from differences in status, including access to education, investment, 
and political power. These problems do not go away, even if a political solution is 
achieved. The economic structure of the conflict, therefore, is critical to determining a 
course for future negotiations. Neither the IPI nor Kerry nor the Arab League should 
ignore the role of the common Palestinian man. For economic cooperation that benefits a 
Palestinian minority will only pour fuel on the toxic divide between the PLO and Hamas 
that already exists within the Palestinian community and provide no relief to the seething 
nationalist elements on either side of the green line, in Israel and Palestine. As Roel 
Meijer writes of the sunset of cosmopolitanism in the Middle East: 
In the eyes of the population, the existence of a ruling elite of bureaucrats, 
large landowners, and businessmen who were conversant in their own 
culture as in that of Europe only further discredited cosmopolitanism. The 
group’s intermediary role between different cultures became suspect as it 
became associated with “social injustice” and the lack of communal spirit, 
which the independence struggle against Western domination and the rise 
of the nation-state demanded of the ruling class.308 
Liberalism often simplistically assumes that the market will automatically resolve 
social problems if given the chance. Every economy is influenced by politics, and every 
                                                 
306 Zubaida,  Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity, 19. 
307 Naava Mashiah, “The Israeli Uprising,”commongroundnews.org, June 28, 2011.   
308 Meijer, Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity, 2. 
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political structure is influenced by economics. Though how and why are difficult to 
determine, they require attention. In the case of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the catalyst is 
Israel’s desire for a nation-state on land already occupied—a point very evident when one 
looks at the conflict through an economic lens. For either a single or two-state solution, 
Israel and Palestine will have to cooperate. Perhaps the question for future research is, 
“what will induce this cooperation?”. 
I conclude with an image of the Holy Land that I believe captures the grace that 
may someday again define it. Shlomo Goitein writes that in early medieval Jerusalem, the 
title of “traveler” was held with great pride. On the return from a voyage, a Jewish 
traveler of those times attended an obligatory public ceremony of thanksgiving for safe 
passage, a custom shared by Christians and Muslims. The traveler would be called to read 
a weekly passage from the Bible, followed by a verse selected particularly for this ritual: 
“Blessed be He who bestows bounties on sinners. He has favored me with His 
bounties.”309  
 
                                                 
309 Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, 352. 
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